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ABSTRACT
This article suggests that we may construct an account of constitutional doctrine in which courts
implement a handful of abstract norms—for example: “states may not undermine the
constitutional structure”—with different doctrinal structures that vary with the practical problems
attending implementation in different contexts. The central insight is that we can identify patterns
in the mass of convoluted constitutional rules, tests and standards that courts use to decide cases.
These patterns suggest deep consensuses on fundamental constitutional requirements. We can
explain a great deal of constitutional doctrine with these basic norms and jettison standard
justifications that make many of these doctrines seem controversial. This runs against
the conventional scholarly account of constitutional practice as dominated by debates between
incommensurable theories of interpretation or value. This simpler account is preferable according
to well-accepted criteria for assessing competing theories developed in the philosophy of science: It is
consistent with our best general theory of law; it can advance constitutional theory beyond the
interpretive debates in which the research program is presently mired; and it is simpler, more
capacious, and more fruitful for future research than conventional accounts. It seems as if we
are fundamentally divided on nearly every constitutional question, but this approach can provide
an alternative to constitutional theory’s traditional focus on interpretive and value controversies
and counter the increasing politicization of constitutional questions with proof that we actually
agree on a number of important constitutional matters.
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INTRODUCTION
1

See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996) (giving an
intellectual history of constitutional theory); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism

Constitutional theory is primarily normative. The research program accordingly lines up well with public views that constitutional
issues are grist for deep disagreements about even the most basic
2
constitutional questions. What gets lost in all this arguing about
what should be done or how things should change is the basic truth
that, despite all our disagreements, we have a stable and durable con3
stitutional system. We need an account of our constitutionalism that
reconciles the existence of deep and wide-ranging division over basic
political and moral matters that bear on constitutional decisionmaking with our system’s undeniable stability. I explore the conceptual foundations for such an account here. Broadly formulated, my
main claim is that, despite the overwhelming emphasis of scholarly
and public debates on constitutional controversies and disagreements, there is also evidence of broad and durable consensus among
legal officials about important structural constitutional norms that
transcend differences of party, interpretive discipline, and views on
political morality. And the existence of broad consensus support may
establish the legal validity of some structural constitutional norms.
The new emphasis I will suggest for constitutional theory advances
our substantive understanding of constitutional law and provides a
firmer foundation for normative constitutional theory, whose goal,
after all, is to “improve the functioning of a massively complex system
4
of governance.” To improve a system, we need a realistic picture of
the system as it stands. Highlighting matters of constitutional consensus is a welcome corrective in what sometimes seems like a deeply
divided polity engaged in disputes about even our most basic constitutional organizing principles. Or so I will argue.

1
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and the Domain of Normative Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523, 523–25 (noting the overwhelming normative bent of constitutional scholarship produced by legal academics).
See, e.g., Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 619, 648–51 (1994) (questioning the possibility of public-values
constitutionalism in light of “widespread disagreement” about both political morality and
constitutional norms). Politics generally is increasingly polarized. See THOMAS E. MANN
& NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 44 (2012)
(canvassing the negative effects of polarization for governance); Geoffrey C. Layman et
al., Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 83, 85–96 (2006) (finding a substantial increase in polarization along party
lines since the 1970s); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 273–74 (2011) (suggesting that a
“defining attribute” of American democracy is partisan polarization). As constitutional
questions become increasingly politicized, they are sucked into an increasingly divided
and divisive public political discourse. See A. Christopher Bryant, Constitutional Forbearance, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 695, 711–18 (2012) (canvassing examples of political polarization in constitutional law).
See, e.g., Herbert G. McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 361, 371–82 (1964) (concluding from survey results that “a democratic society can
survive despite widespread popular misunderstanding and disagreement about basic
democratic and constitutional values,” and calling for exploration of how stability
through such disagreement is possible).
Andrew Coan, Toward a Reality-Based Constitutional Theory, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 273, 274
(2011).
See Stephen M. Griffin, What is Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the
Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (1989) (noting that constitutional interpretation and the countermajoritarian difficulty have been the two central preoccupations of constitutional theory).
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old:
A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 572 (2013) (asserting that interpretive

Perhaps most important among the oversights resulting from constitutional scholarship’s overwhelmingly normative and interpretive
focus is that, so far, we have not thoroughly grappled with the following question: How can we best identify the constitutional norms we
actually have, given the practices we observe and regardless of the
competing views about what our norms or practices should be? I do
not mean that we cannot write a treatise synthesizing from judicial
decisions what the constitutional law is; I mean that we still fundamentally disagree about the basic propositions of constitutional
meaning that explain and justify the rules applied in those judicial
decisions.
One manifestation of this division is the debate between competing theories of constitutional interpretation, which increasingly dom5
inates constitutional scholarship. This conflict has taken on the cast
of a fundamental disagreement between competing visions of the sys6
tem that differ all the way down to the basic content of the law. This

2

3

4
5

6

356
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

debate is important, but it may be insoluble and as it becomes more
7
contentious it increasingly stalls progress. One cannot engage an issue of constitutional law or theory without copping to interpretive
priors; and any progress on such an issue is bracketed by the specter
of counterarguments from competing interpretive theories. Interpretive disagreement is if anything magnified in the structural context—federalism and separation-of-powers doctrines are conventionally explained by a series of contestable interpretive inferences from
scattered constitutional provisions and organizational characteristics
of the text; unsurprisingly, this generates significant interpretive disagreement in structural cases. We need a way around this controversy—not to ignore it, but to make progress on other fronts possible
without having to resolve what may be an irresolvable question. We
should be able to identify those constitutional propositions on which
we agree regardless of our interpretive views. This Article suggests a
way to do that.
We should accordingly want to attend to the positive constitutional theory question—what norms do we have?—and showing that
there is value in doing so, this Article contributes to a perennial and
fundamental debate about the kinds of theories that are worth pursuing—a debate that
. . . extends far beyond Dworkin and Posner and has a venerable and
ancient history that runs through Plato and Thucydides, Kant and
Nietzsche, Hegel and Marx, as well as Rawls and Geuss . . . a dispute
between Moralists and Realists, between those whose starting point is
a theory of how things (morally) ought to be versus those who begin
8
with a theory of how things really are.

theorists have begun arguing that the content of the law is determined by their favored
methodologies).
The preoccupation with interpretation has grown: A search of Westlaw’s Law Review &
Journals database in December 2013 for articles featuring the keywords “originalis!” or
“living constitution!” published in the last decade yields 6,088 results; the same search for
the decade ending 12/12/2003 yields 3,118 results; and for the decade ending
12/12/1993, it yields 1,016 results.
Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurisprudence), 100 GEO. L.J. 865,
867 (2012).

I argue that work identifying what constitutional norms we actually
have in our system is, in fact, worth pursuing for a variety of reasons.
My thesis is that we can explain structural constitutional doctrines
applied in constitutional cases as the products of pragmatic reasoning
about how to implement a handful of abstract and uncontroversial
constitutional norms—we might call them skeletal norms because
they are both thin and fundamental to the structure of the overall sys-

7

8
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tem. In Part I, I illustrate this idea’s plausibility with a capacious example. Assume arguendo that one of our structural norms is that
“states may not take actions that undermine the constitutional structure of which they are parts.” Call this the State Preclusion Thesis
9
(“SPT”). I argue that a number of structural doctrines that are conventionally characterized as implementing distinct and more particularized norms—including, for example, the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, dormant admiralty doctrine, dormant foreign affairs
doctrines, doctrines of dormancy and preemption in immigration,
and the obstacle preemption doctrine—all may be explained as
mechanisms for implementing SPT in different contexts. Decisions
developing and applying these doctrines form a pattern that suggests
SPT is one of our constitutional norms. On this account—which
draws on the recent move in constitutional theory to distinguish constitutional norms from the doctrinal rules with which courts imple10
ment those norms in concrete disputes —the specifics of the doctrinal rules, tests, or standards we observe in these areas are attributable
to pragmatic considerations that relate to the process of judicial implementation of SPT and that vary from one context to another.
I then generalize to look at the implications of building an account in which most of the structural doctrines we observe can be
explained as implementing a few abstract norms like SPT in differing
ways depending on the context. Call this the Skeletal-Norms account
(“SN”). We can debate the reasons why officials accept norms like
SPT and whether they should do so; we can debate the pragmatic rationales for its various implementing doctrines; and so forth—SN just
recommends that we first acknowledge evidence of official consensuses that certain basic structural norms are part of our constitutional
system. SN is preferable to conventional views about how we should
identify the constitutional norms that we have, not least because it is
9
10

I have discussed this hypothetical norm at length elsewhere. See Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497, 512–25 (2012).
See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2004) (canvassing the “metadoctrinalist” literature); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:
How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658 (2005) (discussing “decision rules” and why the Court “might choose decision rules that differ substantially from
the operative positions they are intended to implement”); cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L.
REV. F. 173, 176 (2006), (arguing that constitutional meaning is always influenced by instrumental concerns); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (arguing against a primarily interpretive stage of doctrinal
formulation). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) (elaborating further on the “difference between linguistic
meaning and legal effect”).
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simpler, eliminating the need to infer a wide variety of norms from
our sparse constitutional text to explain the structural doctrines
judges apply. It is also more consistent with our best general theory
of law—legal positivism—and may even provide the beginning of a
way to answer Judge Richard Posner’s challenge that constitutional
theory should either provide some empirically falsifiable claims or
11
close up shop.
Expanding our methods for determining which constitutional
norms we actually have immediately raises two related conceptual issues: First, because complex constitutional practices may have more
than one plausible explanation, we need criteria for assessing competing explanations. Presently, we lack criteria even for assessing
competing normative constitutional theory claims, at least if valid criteria should be independent of the normative commitments of the
competing claims. To demonstrate the SN’s comparative merit, in
Part II I begin filling this gap by exploring criteria for assessing competing accounts of the constitutional norms that we actually have.
These criteria are drawn from the philosophy of science, which has
12
long focused on issues of theory competition and assessment. Of
course, laws and legal phenomena are artifacts of human practices,
and explanations of those artifacts differ from scientific explanations
13
of natural phenomena. But my conceptual and normative claim is
that it is nevertheless useful to assess claims about the content of constitutional norms—claims about what the law is—according to criteria
used to evaluate theories across disciplines in which facts about what
is the case are the central object of inquiry. SN outperforms alternatives—notably theories that identify the constitutional norms that we
have according to either a value criterion (e.g., claims that our actual
constitutional norms are those that promote social justice, liberty,
14
democracy, or something else) or an interpretive method (e.g.,
11
12

13

14

See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1998).
See generally THOMAS KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice, in THE ESSENTIAL
TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 320, 321–322 (1977)
(explaining the consensus scientific theory assessment criteria); Paul R. Thagard, The Best
Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76 (1978) (explaining consensus scientific theory assessment criteria).
Alex Langlinais & Brian Leiter, The Methodology of Legal Philosophy, (in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY 5 (T. Gendler, et al., eds.)(forthcoming),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167498 (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
Cf. Richard Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 549–50
(1999) (arguing that normative constitutional theorists converge on advancing three
principal values—justice, the rule of law, and democracy). See generally RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (arguing that valid legal principles are derived from a moralistic interpretive process).
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See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994) (suggesting that the content of constitutional law just
depends on how the texts “were objectively understood by the people who enacted or ratified them”).
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (describing the theory of
legal positivism); Brian Leiter, Why Legal Positivism (Again)?, at 9–13 (Univ. of Chi. Sch. of
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 442, 2013)
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/ file/442-bl-why-again.pdf (arguing that legal positivism is our best general theory of law).
HART, supra note 16, at 94–110.
Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 523, 531–34 (2013).

claims that our actual constitutional norms are those derived by
15
proper originalist interpretation) —on these theory selection criteria. SN is simpler than these alternatives because it can explain numerous doctrines with a single, uncontroversial norm rather than
with multiple norms derived by contestable interpretive or valuebased arguments. It reconciles the stability of the constitutional system with the appearance of widespread disagreement on various issues by suggesting that what we disagree about are the implementing
rules, not the more basic underlying constitutional requirements the
rules are designed to enforce. And it is consistent with our other
well-founded views about the world, including legal positivism.
Second, we need to develop a way to determine whether a norm
proposed to explain a set of constitutional doctrines is, in fact, a valid
norm of constitutional law—that is, whether our best explanatory account actually reflects reality. This creates an important opportunity
to begin reconciling constitutional theory with general theories of
law. In Part III, I draw on one general theory of the nature of law—
16
legal positivism —to argue that norms about which there is robust
and durable consensus among legal officials may be valid in virtue of
that consensus. One of positivism’s core claims is that the content of
the law of any given legal system—including its constitutional law—is
ultimately a matter of social fact. Norms are valid laws in a legal system if they satisfy the criteria of legal validity that the system’s legal
17
officials accept as obligatory. Positivism leaves room for all kinds of
validity criteria, including criteria that validate norms, because they
are accepted by most judges, legal officials, or members of the pub18
lic—customary norms, for example, are validated in this way. On
this view, evidence of widespread official consensus on the validity of
a norm like SPT may be evidence of that norm’s actual legal validity—its existence as a norm of the system. This kind of view might
even give way to some empirically testable hypotheses about the content of our constitutional law, as Judge Posner demanded.

15

16

17
18
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Part III then returns to disagreements about the proper theory of
constitutional interpretation, which some characterize as theoretical
disagreements among legal officials about our system’s criteria of legal validity. If it’s correct, that observation may undermine either the
positivist claim that laws are valid in virtue of consensus or, if positivism’s general account is right, disproving the existence of consensus
19
validity criteria for most constitutional law. To bracket these interpretive debates and develop claims about constitutional practice independent of contestable interpretive assumptions, I argue that we
should assume that structural norms are simple propositions on
which interpreters of every view could agree. This allows us to set
aside the interpretive theory debate—judges may have different reasons for accepting those skeletal norms, but evidence that they are
accepted has independent importance—and take up, for example,
questions about the norms’ implementation. SN also shows one way
in which constitutional norms might be validated by consensus even
in the midst of widespread interpretive disagreement.
Constitutional theory and doctrine are complex and confusing;
constitutional debates—both public and academic—portray the system as fundamentally divided and disharmonious; and the reasons
judges give for particular structural case outcomes are often vague,
contradictory, or hotly disputed by other members of the court. But
the striking upshot of the theses I develop here is that despite all this,
there is evidence that, when examined with new conceptual tools,
suggests significant agreement on basic structural constitutional
commitments like SPT. Interpretive debate, multifarious decisional
influences, and other dynamics render judicial explanations either
unreliable or scattered if taken at face value; but what judges say may
be less important in this context than what they do—the patterns
formed by their actual decisions over the long term are evidence of
the norms that our courts accept, and perhaps better evidence, all
else equal, than what they say by way of formal explanation. And in
politically and socially divided times, developing a method for working rigorously through these questions helpfully moves back to the
foreground the important idea—often occluded by modern theory—
that constitutions are products of consensus.

19

See DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 4–6 (articulating this as a critique of legal positivism); Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1239–40 (2009)
(reconciling positivism with theoretical disagreement by suggesting that instances of disagreement simply show an absence of existing facts of the matter about what the law is).
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See, e.g., Pursley, supra note 9, at 523–28 (making various interpretive cases for the State
Preclusion Thesis).
Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220,
220–21 (2006) (footnote omitted) (quoting Berman, supra note 10, at 36).

I have argued at length elsewhere that the State Preclusion Thesis
(“SPT”) is supported by the constitutional text, history, straightforward constitutional purposes, and the pragmatic necessaries of mod20
ern constitutional practice. Perhaps the clearest and simplest reason to accept it is that SPT is the kind of norm you would adopt if you
were trying to structure a durable federalist constitutional system.
Generally speaking, the fewer specifications you make about the
structure, the lower the risk of major pushes to abandon the Constitution in order to restructure the government. It is SPT’s appeal to
common sense that I rely upon here. The point is to hypothesize that
SPT is a valid norm in our system and then see how much of the decisional phenomena it can explain. In this Part, I offer a new account
of the constitutional foundation of immigration and obstacle
preemption doctrines, arguing that they may be viewed as implementing SPT in different ways depending on instrumental (pragmatic) adjudicatory concerns that differ with the context. In the process,
I explain how this kind of account can help resolve several curiosities
and controversies surrounding these doctrines to set the stage for the
more general case for this kind of re-theorizing that I make in Parts II
and III. In those Parts, I defend the view that this approach to
demonstrating the existence of a constitutional norm—gathering evidence of patterns in constitutional practice that suggest the norm is
at work—is preferable to conventional accounts that derive norms by
interpretive method (originalism, etc.) or by the application of value
criteria (justice, etc.). Among other reasons, this approach is preferable because it is more consistent with our best general theory of law,
legal positivism, and helps resolve some of the most persistent problems of constitutional theory.
Throughout this Part, I draw heavily on the “two-output thesis,”
viz.: “‘[T]here exists a conceptual distinction between two sorts of
judicial work product each of which is integral to the functioning of
constitutional adjudication,’ namely judge-interpreted constitutional
meaning and judge-crafted tests bearing an instrumental relationship
21
to that meaning.” To avoid confusing this conception with one with
which some particular theory of interpretation is required, I call
statements of judge- interpreted constitutional meaning “constitu20
21
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tional operative propositions,” using Berman’s intentionally non22
committal terms. The judge-crafted rules, tests, and standards are
the “decision rules” by which courts determine whether conduct falls
within the scope of a constitutional prohibition or permission and are
23
separate from the constitutional operative propositions themselves.
The instrumental relationship between the operative propositions
and the decision rules is that the latter implement the former—they
facilitate the application of broad propositions of constitutional
24
meaning to resolve disputes in concrete cases. Decision rules are
shaped both by the operative propositions that they implement and
by instrumental or pragmatic considerations relevant to implementing the operative proposition in concrete contexts. Relevant pragmatic considerations include things like comparative institutional capacity deficits; adjudicatory efficiency; the risk, likely rate, and costs
of adjudicatory errors; risks of creating interbranch friction; repeatplayer considerations attendant to adopting formalistic rather than
25
flexible decision rules, and the like. These considerations vary by
context; accordingly, the decision rules implementing a single norm
like SPT in the interstate commerce, admiralty, foreign affairs, immigration, and general preemption contexts—subject matter areas that
are themselves vast and differ from each other in substantial ways—
will diverge.
A. Standard Dormancy Doctrines

Berman, supra note 10, at 57–58 & n.192
Id. at 32–36 (describing “implementation” of constitutional norms by constitutional
rules); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37–44 (2001)
(similar).
See Pursley, supra note 9, at 504–08 (discussing the relationship between the operative
propositions and the decision rules).
See id. at 506–12; Roosevelt, supra note 10, at 1658–60.
See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (dormant admiralty doctrine);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (dormant foreign affairs doctrine); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (dormant Commerce Clause).
Cf. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 530–33 & n.128 (2008) (noting “atextuality” critiques of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).

The dormant Commerce Clause, dormant admiralty, and
26
dormant foreign affairs doctrines —what we might call the “standard” dormancy rules—are at best difficult to derive the constitutional
text. Conventionally, they are said to subtend “negative aspects” of
national government powers, but the relevant constitutional powerconferring provisions say nothing about precluding state action as the
27
dormancy doctrines do. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
22
23

24
25
26

27
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United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338–39
(2007) (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624).
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436.
See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 327–28 (1994); Wardair
Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1986).
See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (“Absent a compelling justification, however, a State may not advance its legitimate goals by
means that facially discriminate against foreign commerce.”).
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401, 423–24 (2003) (holding that a California statute was invalid because it “undercut[] the President’s diplomatic discretion and
the choice he . . . made exercising it”); see also Pursley, supra note 9, at 553–54 (assessing
readings of Garamendi’s holding).
See Pursley, supra note 9, at 537–61 (identifying three subject matter areas where constitutional dormancy operates and their importance).

subjects state actions that discriminate against out-of-state commercial
activity—for example, by favoring local over out-of-state entities—to
strict scrutiny that amounts in practice to a “virtually per se rule of in28
validity;” and evaluates nondiscriminatory state actions according to
whether the burdens they impose on interstate commerce are “clearly
29
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” The dormant
admiralty doctrine invalidates state action that “works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its in30
ternational and interstate relations.” There are multiple dormant
foreign affairs doctrines; the best established are the background rule
that “state involvement in foreign affairs and international rela31
tions . . . is forbidden;” the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause rule
precluding state actions that affect international commerce in a
32
manner likely to provoke international retaliation —with a categorical preclusion of state actions that facially discriminate against foreign commercial actors that mirrors the dormant Commerce Clause’s
33
virtually per se invalidity rule —or that “prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice when regulation commercial
34
relations with foreign governments’” ; and, somewhat less than clear,
the Garamendi doctrine precluding state interference with executive35
branch foreign affairs activities.
Although their dramatic differences make a unifying explanation
of these dormancy doctrines seem unlikely, they do have something
in common: They all preclude state action that interferes with the
constitutional structure and thus may be characterized as implement36
ing SPT. I have argued this point at length elsewhere and will only
briefly rehearse it here: In commerce, state actions that undermine
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35

36
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See id. at 500 (arguing that state preclusion is important to maintain constitutional integrity).
See Berman, supra note 10, at 35–36, 61–72. Cf. PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74–92 (1984) (discussing structural arguments).
See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87,
143–44 (2001) (noting the Court’s wariness about displacing legislative judgments);
Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 417, 494 (2008) (noting courts’ institutional capacity deficits).
Pursley, supra note 9, at 534–54.

the national economy (and thus, potentially, the stability of the entire
system of government) are targeted; in admiralty, dormancy invalidates applications state law that undermine the uniformity of maritime law and, thus, the functioning of admiralty jurisdiction; and in
foreign affairs, dormancy precludes state actions that interfere with
federal control of international relations. These doctrines thus all
may be viewed as implementing the simple structural proposition that
states are constitutionally precluded from acting in a manner that
undermines the larger constitutional structure of which they are a
37
part.
Thus, if we assume arguendo that courts accept it, SPT provides a
single constitutional grounding for all the standard dormancy doctrines. Of course, these rules differ substantially from SPT and, accordingly, enforce SPT in different ways. This is unsurprising—rules,
tests, and standards of constitutional doctrine often differ in content
from the underlying constitutional norms they implement; that variance may be explained, again, in terms of the pragmatic concerns
about the process of constitutional adjudication in the relevant con38
text. The standard dormancy doctrines’ differences thus may be attributable to pragmatic reasons for courts to enforce SPT in different
ways or with differing degrees of stringency in different contexts.
The dormant Commerce Clause precludes relatively little state action
and incorporates substantial deference to Congress because, in principle, Congress has greater capacity on economic questions and
39
courts, accordingly, face significant risks of adjudicatory error. The
dormant admiralty and foreign affairs doctrines, by contrast, preclude a wider array of state actions and incorporate less deference
because, among other things, in those contexts the potential negative
consequences of state interference are more significant and the risk
of adjudicatory error is reduced by the existence of decent proxies
for state interference (the waterline or the relatively readily discerni40
ble indicia of international effect).
An explanatory account on which these standard dormancy doctrines all implement SPT is preferable to conventional accounts for
37
38
39

40
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several reasons. First and most obviously, it explains several complex
lines of doctrine with a single, simple normative predicate rather
41
than by positing a distinct norm of contestable validity for each area.
Second, the SPT account explains a number of exceptions and other
features of these doctrines that are puzzles for conventional accounts.
I have discussed these in detail elsewhere; here I will emphasize just a
couple of examples: Conventional explanations of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine ground the doctrine either on the text of
the Commerce Clause or on some implied free-market or interstate42
harmony promoting norm.
The first account is problematic because the Commerce Clause is a grant of power to Congress and, fa43
cially, seems unrelated to precluding state action; the second kind of
account is problematic because the economic norms adduced rely on
44
multiple contestable interpretive inferences.
SPT suffers neither
problem—it is, like the doctrine it explains, directly concerned with
precluding state action and it is fairly uncontroversial as a matter of
structural inference. Similarly, the SPT account is preferable to the
conventional constitutional view that the dormant admiralty doctrine
is grounded on the constitutional provision of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts—a textual provision that has
even less to do with precluding state action than does the Commerce
Clause, if that is possible; and predictably accounts of the doctrine as
45
predicated on the Admiralty Clause are contested.
41
42

43

44

45

See generally infra Part II.B (arguing that simpler explanations of legal phenomena are
preferable to more complex ones).
See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (suggesting the commerce
power is to some extent exclusive, or at the least, that direct state interference with its exercise is precluded); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 43, 63–64 (1988) (discussing harmony rationale); Julian N. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429–35 (1982) (discussing free market
rationale).
See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1785 (2005) (noting the disconnect
between the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the constitutional text).
See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 217 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (calling the dormant Commerce Clause an artifact of “a grim sink-or-swim policy of
laissez-faire economics”). See generally Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125 (1979) (canvassing criticisms and discussing various, and
sometimes competing, tests that the Supreme Court has employed and/or should employ
in its dormant Commerce Clause cases).
See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J.
MAR. L. & COMM. 1, 7–14 (1997) (discussing the developments in dormant Admiralty
Clause doctrine after Jensen); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal Common Law and Congressional
Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 376–78 (2000) (outlining conflicting perspectives on the “federal common law of admiralty” and its legitimacy post-Erie); Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 274, 277
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(1999) (describing and criticizing conventional justifications for federal preemption in
admiralty law).
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000) (deciding a
foreign affairs case solely on preemption grounds despite the lower court’s dormancy
clause holding); see also Robert J. Reinsten, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
259, 332–33 (2009) (noting the shift away from Zschernig).
See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.

In the foreign affairs context, the conventional external sovereignty/plenary power rationale for preclusion doctrines is difficult to
reconcile with the observable shift in judicial decisions away from applying the broad Zschernig dormancy rule to a greater reliance on the
narrower dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, Garamendi, and
46
preemption doctrines. Why analyze state actions touching on foreign affairs for conflicts with positive federal enactments if the entire
field is off limits to the states? A similar transition has occurred in the
47
immigration context, as we will see below. The SPT account more
easily explains this shift: Courts could correctly conclude that it is
difficult to enforce a general preclusion of state action touching on a
subject like foreign affairs while also giving due attention to the federalism-based reasons to leave intact state actions that would otherwise clearly fall within the police power. Applying such a doctrine involves a complex balancing of potentially incommensurable
constitutional values and a high risk of potentially costly adjudicatory
errors. Federal enactments, however, crystallize broad grants of policymaking discretion—they demonstrate what the political branches
think they can and should be doing in foreign affairs—and accordingly provide useful signals from more expert institutions to courts
regarding which state actions should be precluded and which should
be allowed to stand. Shifting to using preemption doctrine in these
contexts is a reasonable doctrinal strategy for incorporating these
signals into judicial decision-making and, perhaps, reducing the potential for error.
A variety of additional benefits support the SPT account of the
standard dormancy doctrines over conventional views. If SPT can
explain still other categories of structural doctrine, then the case for
thinking it and similar norms provide a better explanation for this
segment of our constitutional practice is further strengthened.

46

47
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The doctrine governing the constitutionality of state involvement
48
in immigration regulation is complex and controversial. For nearly
a century, courts have treated immigration as a matter for exclusively
49
federal regulation. But state and local government involvement in
50
immigration regulation has increased dramatically in recent years.
Since the federal government, so far, has not responded to calls for
immigration reform in a systematic way, state and local governments
51
have moved in to fill the perceived vacuum. This recent surge in
state and local action—mostly aimed at deterring or punishing unauthorized immigration—has been controversial. Aside from political,
practical, and moral debates, these state immigration laws raise difficult questions about the constitutional allocation of power between
52
the federal and state governments. If federal immigration power is
supposed to be plenary and exclusive, how can states enact widebodied laws designed to force “attrition” of unauthorized immi53
grants? I argue that refocusing debates about structural immigra48

49

50

51

52
53

See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 S. CT. REV. 255, 256, 260 (1984) (describing immigration as “multidimensional” and not bound by the normal rules of constitutional law); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549, 560 (1990) (describing immigration law as an
aberration of the typical relationship between statutory interpretation and constitutional
law); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1984) (arguing the epiphenomenal nature of immigration law).
Compare Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that “the
power of exclusion” is “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the
United States”), with De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably an exclusively federal power.”).
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Immigration Policy Project: 2010 ImmigrationRelated Laws and Resolutions in the States (January 1–March 31, 2010), Apr. 27, 2010, at 1–2,
http://www.ncsl.org/ default.aspx?tabid=21857 (listing various bills and resolutions relating to immigration that states had introduced during the first quarter of 2010, as well as
increases in previous years).
See Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause
Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1822–23 (2007) (arguing
that the reason for the recent increase in state action is Congress’s failure to act, notwithstanding immigration policy being within the purview of the Federal Government); Nat’l
Conf. of State Legis., Broken Federal Immigration Policy Leaves States In A Lurch: With No Federal Legislation, State Legislatures Move To Enact Local Solutions, NSCL NEWS (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=21843) (describing the efforts of forty-six state
legislatures and the District of Columbia to enact laws addressing immigration reform).
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV.
787, 790 (2008).
See generally Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339 (2013) (giving a
history of state involvement with immigration and a survey of the many current state actions).
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tion doctrine around SPT, rather than a constitutional provision for
an exclusively federal immigration power, will clarify and advance
these debates and, importantly, better explain immigration powers
doctrine as it stands.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the national gov54
ernment’s immigration power is both plenary and exclusive. The
exclusivity holding means, as with the standard dormancy doctrines,
that certain state actions touching on immigration are precluded by
“the Constitution of its own force”—that is, ex ante—without regard
55
to the existence of positive federal immigration law. Courts have
made clear that this “dormant immigration doctrine” at least bars
state enactment of so-called “pure” immigration law, viz.: Laws “determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturaliza56
tion, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.” The
conventional justification for this ex ante preclusion involves a complex combination of the Naturalization Clause, the Foreign Affairs
Clauses, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and an extra-constitutional
57
theory of [powers] inherent [in] national sovereignty.
Along with its contestable foundation in the constitutional text
and history of acceptance in judicial practice, the dormant immigra54

55
56

57

See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609; see also Cristina
M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567,
570 (2008) (describing the “exclusivity principle” as “deeply entrenched in constitutional
and political rhetoric”); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 57 (2007) (“Probably no principle in immigration law is more firmly established, or of greater antiquity, than the plenary power of the federal government to
regulate immigration.”); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of DemiSovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 138–9 (1994) (noting federal exclusivity as required in
immigration law).
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). See also Huntington, supra
note 52, at 807 (discussing exclusivity with respect to pure immigration law); Michael J.
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 502 (2001) (noting the accepted definition of immigration
law as the regulation of “the admission and expulsion of noncitizens”).
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (explaining that federal immigration power “rests in part on the National Government’s power to ‘establish a uniform
rule of naturalization,’ and its inherent power as sovereign to control relations with foreign nations”); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 81–83 (2002) (arguing that authority to regulate immigration is not expressly addressed in constitutional text, but comes from the Naturalization Clause, the Migration
Clause, and the Taxation Clause);Wishnie, supra note 56, at 529–30 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s comments on devolvability and examining the devolvability of the sources
of the unenumerated power to regulate immigration)
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Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968).
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
See Pursley, supra note 9, at 500.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952).
See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 353–4 (9th Cir. 2011).
See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (“But the Court has never held that every
state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration as thus
per se pre-empted by this constitutional power . . . .”); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372–73 (1971) (noting state laws directed at non-residents that were upheld over
constitutional challenge).
See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 (1982) (“[The states] can neither add to nor take from
the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization, and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.”).
Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 571. Rodriguez also argues that that “immigration regulation should be included in the list of quintessentially state interests.” Id.
See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (stating that “they [aliens] cannot live
where they cannot work”).

tion doctrine draws support from the connection between immigration and foreign affairs. The latter context has broad doctrines precluding state interference, including the Zschernig background rule
that state involvement in “foreign affairs and international relations is
58
. . . forbidden” and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause rule
precluding state actions that undermine the nation’s ability to
59
“speak[] with one voice” in foreign affairs. These doctrines straightforwardly implement SPT: Foreign policy is crucial to national stability and is undermined when national and state governments send
mixed or conflicting signals; thus state action affecting foreign affairs
will frequently threaten the constitutional structure and is therefore
60
The substantial connection between
properly presumed invalid.
immigration and foreign relations means that state action on immi61
gration will almost always have some effect on foreign affairs. Arizona’s S.B. 1070, for example, sparked a diplomatic uproar and con62
demnation from foreign governments. Despite strong reasons to
favor a uniform federal immigration law, the dormant immigration
doctrine is less than an absolute preclusion of state action in prac63
tice. There are two fairly well-established exceptions: First, while
the Court has expressly held that states do not possess authority to di64
rectly regulate immigration, it has also acknowledged that the states’
police powers encompass some actions that affect immigrants in the
course of advancing “traditional” state interests like “education, crime
65
control, and the regulation of health, safety and welfare.” These decisions draw a rough distinction between immigrant “selection” and
“regulation” rules.
Selection rules—or rules of “entrance and
66
abode” —“ha[ve] to do with sorting” immigrants across geographic

58
59
60
61
62
63

64

65
66
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areas and are considered the core of the federal immigration power.
Accordingly, states are precluded from enacting their own immigrant-selection measures and from interfering with federal selection
68
law. Immigrant regulation rules, on the other hand, “ha[ve] to do
with the process of determining how immigrants residing in the
United States live their lives;” and this category of immigration rules,
while clearly within the federal immigration power, has received
69
more confounding treatment in immigration-power doctrine. In
principle at least, state regulatory rules need not be categorically pre70
cluded because they only indirectly affect immigrant selection.
A simple dormant immigration rule would dictate clear results in
a vacuum—absent positive federal immigration law, state laws touching on immigration are wholly precluded. Things become more
complicated when positive federal law enters the picture, both be71
cause federal immigration laws are complex and because they may
contain signals of federal views about the permissibility of state action
in the field. In its most recent immigration power case—the decision
invalidating most of the challenged provisions of Arizona’s controversial S.B. 1070—the Supreme Court both reaffirmed the primacy of
federal immigration power and demonstrated that the volume of existing positive immigration law makes preemption doctrine a useful
substitute for the broader dormant immigration rule in contempo72
rary cases. Congress may, for example, preempt state immigration
regulatory actions even if they would be otherwise permissible, as in

67

68

69
70

71
72

See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 345–46
(2008) (noting that “selection” is concerned with sorting, while regulation is concerned
with the determination of how immigrants in the United States lead their lives).
Id. at 354; see also Huntington, supra note 52, at 807–20 (noting that “[a] self definition
view of immigration law does not allow a role for states and localities because selfdefinition is understood as a national process”).
Cox, supra note 67, at 345–46; see also id. at 353–55 (stating that “[c]ourts have been deeply divided over which sorts of rules states have the power to pass”).
See Cox, supra note 67, at 351–53 (explaining the difficulty in reviewing “alienage rules,”
which only indirectly impact immigration); Huntington, supra note 52, at 807–17 (analyzing federal exclusivity over immigration and noting that recent state involvement “falls
short of pure immigration law”); M. Isabel Medina, Symposium on Federalism at Work: State
Criminal Law, Noncitizens, and Immigration-Related Activity—An Introduction, 12 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 265 (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1843401 (discussing when federal preemption of state regulations affecting immigration may or may
not be appropriate); Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 571–72 (arguing that there is a “structural need for federal, state, and local participation in immigration regulation”).
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
Id. at 2510 (holding three of four provisions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 preempted and
reemphasizing federal primacy in immigration and immigration’s relation to foreign affairs).
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Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a et seq. (2008).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2) (2008). This provision effectively overrules De Canas. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974–75 (2011) (discussing IRCA and noting that after its passage, “state laws imposing civil fines for the employment of unauthorized workers like the one we upheld in De Canas are now expressly preempted”).
See, e.g., United States. v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 365 (9th Cir. 2011).
Huntington, supra note 52, at 805–07.
See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12 (1982); Schuck, supra note 54, at 57.
Huntington, supra note 52, at 807.
8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2008); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968,
1975 (2011) (discussing this provision).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2010).
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976).

the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) provision expressly preempting state laws imposing penalties on employers who
74
hire unauthorized immigrants. Judicial recognition of congressional primacy on immigration also, however, gives rise to the second exception to the dormant immigration rule—just as state actions that
would otherwise fall within the police power exception to the
75
dormant immigration rule may be preempted by statute, state ac76
tions that would otherwise be precluded can be authorized by statute.
States may exercise authority pursuant to express or implied delegations from the federal government to regulate immigration them77
78
selves or enforce federal immigration laws. Federal statutes that
expressly delegate immigration authority to state governments include, for example, an Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provision permitting states to decide whether to provide public benefits
79
to unauthorized immigrants; an IRCA provision allowing states to
sanction hiring of unauthorized immigrants “through licensing and
80
similar laws;” and Section 287(g) of the INA, authorizing states to
enter into agreements with the Justice Department for cooperative
81
enforcement of federal immigration law.
Given the substantial deference courts accord the federal political
82
branches on immigration issues, it is not surprising that courts treat
congressional signals about state action’s permissibility as dispositive
most of the time. But plumbing for these signals complicates judicial
application of the dormant immigration rule. The search for congressional permission in federal immigration statutes requires a
preemption-like inquiry into the existence of express or implied congressional permission, strikingly like the search for congressional
permissions under the parallel exception to the dormant Foreign
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76
77
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79
80
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Commerce Clause doctrine. A representative articulation is found
84
in Toll v. Moreno. The inquiry resembles preemption analysis insofar
as the Court examines relevant federal enactments for signals regarding the permissibility of the challenged state law; but this is, in an important sense, the reverse of conventional preemption analysis. The
search is not for congressional intent to preempt state law against a
default rule of state power in the absence of such intent as in a con85
ventional preemption case; instead, it is a search for congressional
permission for state action against a default rule that states lack pow86
er without congressional permission.
Observing that much potential state interference does not clearly
resemble the exercise of a power to directly regulate immigration
that is dedicated exclusively to the federal government highlights the
weakness of the conventional exclusive-federal-power explanation of
the doctrine. Even if precluding these other forms of state interference is constitutionally necessary or otherwise desirable, judicial use
of a formalistic distinction between exercises of immigration power
and conventional state powers makes it difficult to reach that result:
State police power authorizes a variety of actions that raise the same
concerns as direct state exercise of the federal immigration power,
but such actions cannot readily be characterized as direct usurpations
of federal power. Deciding immigration power questions according
to the category of power under which state action is taken thus will
allow a substantial volume of state interference to slip through the
proverbial doctrinal cracks. This “power matching problem” inheres
in most judicial attempts to fashion rules that preclude state en87
croachment on fields of exclusive federal authority. Put differently,
a power-focused doctrine magnifies the risk of adjudicatory error in a
context in which the foreign relations implications of immigration
law ratchet up the potential costs of adjudicatory errors that
88
underenforce the constitutional preclusion of state action.

83

84
85
86
87
88

E.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.., 512 U.S. 298, 323–25 (1994); Japan Line,
Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). For further discussion, see Pursley,
supra note 9, at 546–48.
458 U.S. 1 (1982).
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
Toll, 458 U.S. at 11 n.16, 13 n.18.
Pursley, supra note 9, at 516–17 (discussing the power matching problem generally).
See id. at 557 (arguing that adjudicatory error costs are heightened in foreign-affairs related doctrinal contexts); Spiro, supra note 54, at 144 (arguing that in immigration and foreign affairs “the stakes are of such magnitude as to readily defeat the interests of federalism; echoes of ‘the Constitution is not a suicide pact’ haunt any claim of state right”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)).
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The Court recognized this problem early on in the immigration
context:
A law or rule emanating from any lawful authority, which prescribes
terms or conditions on which alone [a] vessel can discharge its passengers, is a regulation of commerce and, in case of vessels and passengers
coming from foreign ports, is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations . . . . But assuming that, in the formation of our government, certain powers necessary to the administration of their internal affairs are
reserved to the States, and that among those powers are those for the
preservation of good order, of the health and comfort of the citizens, . . . and other matters of legislation of like character, they insist that
the power here exercised falls within this class, and belongs rightfully to
the States. This power . . . has been . . . called the police power. It is not
necessary for the course of this discussion to attempt to define it more
accurately than it has been defined already . . . because whatever may be
the nature and extent of that power, where not otherwise restricted, no
definition of it, and no urgency for its use, can authorize a State to exercise it in regard to a subject-matter which has been confided exclusively
89
to the discretion of Congress by the Constitution.

Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1876).
See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
See Toll, 458 U.S. at 13–20.

This suggests that doctrine might avoid the power matching problem
by focusing on the subject of state action rather than the power under
which it is taken. Determining state action’s true purpose is also difficult; but one way to begin is by assessing the action’s real effects.
SPT is concerned, of course, precisely with the effects of state action
on the stability of the constitutional system.
SPT grounds an alternative account of immigration power doctrine that reconciles the dormant immigration doctrine with its exceptions, with courts’ continuing use of the slippery distinction between selection and regulatory rules in the immigration field, and
with the shift in recent decades from a dormancy analysis to a
90
preemption-first approach. Such an account dissolves the problem
of textual foundation by anchoring the doctrine firmly to an uncon91
The hypothesis that SPT
troversial implied structural norm.
grounds the doctrine immediately seems legitimate and worthy of
exploration because the reasons conventionally cited by courts and
commentators in support of the dormant immigration doctrine relate
directly to the undesirable consequences of state interference with
the federal immigration system. For example, some argue that allowing state immigration regulation might “erode the antidiscrimination
and anticaste principles that are at the heart of our Constitution and

89
90
91
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Wishnie, supra note 56, at 553. There have, of course, been instances of discriminatory
federal action based on alienage and nationality as well—the Chinese Exclusion Case and
Korematsu leap immediately to mind. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Wishnie, supra note
56, at 555–56, n.328 (citing other examples of federal “restrictionist legislation”). But the
states’ history in this regard is comparatively worse. Wishnie, supra note 56, at 556–57.
This history is part of the reason that state immigration-status distinctions are subject to
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371–72 (1971). Alienage distinctions in federal law, by contrast, are uniformly subject to rational basis review. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
Cox, supra note 67, at 389–90.
Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 639–40.
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65–66 (1941) (suggesting that a constitutional preclusion predicated on an exclusively federal power should, in principle, extend to any
state regulation of immigrants).
See supra notes 63–81 and accompanying text.
On judicial underenforcement of constitutional norms, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1213–20 (1978) (discussing the requirement of exhaustion.).
E.g., Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 610, 617–23.

that long have protected noncitizens at the subfederal level.” And,
states empowered to regulate immigration may export the costs of
immigration onto other states by enacting immigration restrictions
designed to funnel immigrants away into other, more hospitable,
93
state legal environments, which might fuel undesirable races to the
94
bottom.
The harder question is how the doctrinal exceptions permitting
state actions affecting immigration also may fairly be characterized as
implementing SPT. The first puzzle is the tension between judicial
statements about the primacy of federal immigration power and the
reality of widespread state action affecting immigration. The federal
exclusivity, foreign affairs, and federal uniformity rationales for the
dormant immigration doctrine apply in principle to every state action
95
that affects immigrants, no matter how indirectly or insubstantially.
But the cases demonstrate that a variety of state actions are not precluded even though they may interfere to some degree with federal
immigration authority; thus, contrary to the conventional account, it
is difficult to square the existing doctrine with the claim that federal
96
immigration power is categorically exclusive.
On an exclusivefederal-power account, reconciling the normative predicate with the
actual decision requires either a counterintuitive conception of the
scope of federal exclusivity or the conclusion that federal exclusivity
97
is significantly underenforced by courts. Some commentators argue, instead, that the exceptions exist because states possess some
98
measure of concurrent authority to regulate immigration. That may

92
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94
95

96
97
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Dec. 2015]
SKELETAL NORMS

375

See supra notes 23–5 and accompanying text (discussing instrumental determinants of
doctrine); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (noting that
“[f]ederal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex” and describing various provisions of immigration law in effect).
See Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 611–14 (giving a history of state involvement with immigration, noting that it vanished for most of the century following the Civil War).
See Spiro, supra note 54, at 156–57.
See Delaney, supra note 51, at 1830 n.48.
Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 615; Spiro, supra note 54, at 161–63.

explain the doctrine, but it does not explain a century of judicial
rhetoric emphasizing the primacy of federal power. The SPT account
explains both.
The high cost of adjudicatory error in immigration cases flows
from their connection to foreign affairs; the risk that any given state
action affecting immigrants will interfere with federal authority on
immigration is magnified by the pervasiveness of positive federal im99
migration law; and the history of minimal state involvement with
immigration makes even small state forays into the field seem like
100
large departures from standard practice.
Together, these instrumental considerations could make reasonable a default presumption
that state action affecting immigration likely will interfere with the
constitutional structure. A state action’s visible connection to immi101
gration, on this view, is a proxy for a likely violation of SPT. There
is little risk of adjudicatory error in applying this default rule, since
most state actions’ immigration effects, or lack thereof, will be fairly
obvious for the reasons I have mentioned.
The distinction between selection and regulatory rules, however,
bifurcates the general dormancy doctrine: State actions that amount
to the imposition of selection rules are presumptively invalid, but
state actions that function primarily as regulatory rules are evaluated
more case by case. This is difficult to explain on the exclusive power
view, but if the underlying constitutional norm is instead about assessing the magnitude of state interference, then an exception for
state regulation of immigration pursuant to police power may be justifiable as a way to identify and preserve against invalidation categories of state actions that are valuable to states and unlikely to undermine the system. Not every immigration issue has significant foreign
102
affairs implications; nor does every state action affecting immigra103
tion actually risk destabilizing the system. And, many state actions
affecting immigration will advance substantial state interests of the
kind that motivate judicial efforts to protect state autonomy from

99

100
101
102
103
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See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500 (emphasizing Arizona’s interests in regulating undocumented immigration and noting that “[t]he pervasiveness of federal [immigration] regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States”). For
more general discussions of these federalism concerns, see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 713 (1999) (articulating modern federalism-based limitations on federal power);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“While Congress has substantial
powers to govern the Nation directly . . . the Constitution has never been understood to
confer upon Congress the ability to require States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (noting that although “Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States . . . [it] is an extraordinary
power in a federalist system . . . [and] we must assume Congress does not exercise [that
power] lightly”) .
See Delaney, supra note 51, at 1833.
See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.

federal overreaching.
Courts will need to weigh federalism concerns against the reasons for federal exclusivity. The question for
doctrine makers is: What rule best accommodates these competing
considerations?
One instrumentally justifiable approach is to use the selection/regulation distinction as a front-end filter to distinguish state actions that should be presumed to threaten significant interference
from those that pose less systemic risk and may have greater federalism value. Courts can identify with relative ease state actions that are
effectively selection rules, and it would be reasonable in the light of
the pragmatic considerations for courts to presume that those actions
likely will be destabilizing in light of the comprehensive federal selection regime. It is more difficult to justify a categorical presumption
that state actions with only indirect effects on immigration violate
SPT: Whether the constitutional structure will be better served by invalidating such a measure or permitting it to further federalism values is less clear and will vary from case to case. For these state actions, then, courts might reasonably conclude that SPT is best
implemented by a more searching inquiry into the weight of the relevant considerations in the particular case. The distinction between
selection and regulation thus can be viewed as a proxy identifying
cases that present the difficult question of where federal immigration
power ends and legitimate state police power begins—a question that
105
the Court has not yet thoroughly answered.
SPT also explains the congressional permission exception to the
dormant immigration doctrine—an exception that is, as I noted, very
difficult to reconcile with the idea that federal immigration power is
106
exclusive by constitutional mandate.
If there is a core of nondelegable federal immigration power, then any attempt to delegate it
to states perforce violates SPT by contravening a mandatory structural
104

105
106
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See Wishnie, supra note 56, at 532–49 (exploring the possibility of non-delegable federal
immigration power).
Scholars have increasingly noted that federal immigration power has been delegated to
both private actors and the states. For an overview of this discussion, see generally Adam
B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285 (2012).
I have explored this argument—that state interference with exclusive federal powers constitutes interference with the constitutional structure—at length elsewhere. See Pursley,
supra note 9, at 514–16; see also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 447–49
(1827) (holding that state power may not “be used so as to obstruct the free course of a
power given to Congress”).
See supra notes 87–8 and accompanying text (noting the power matching problem).
See Spiro, supra note 54, at 156.
See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009); Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988).

requirement (the exclusive provision of power to Congress). Even
if federal immigration power includes the discretion to delegate it as
Congress sees fit—as one might argue on a strong view of that pow108
er’s unconditionality —unauthorized state exercises of it would still
109
But our focus is on the instrumental determinants of
violate SPT.
doctrine, and regardless of the best answer to the delegability question, the power matching problem will make it difficult to distinguish
the state actions that amount to impermissible exercises of the exclu110
sive part of federal immigration power from those that do not.
Thus it will be hard to design doctrinal rules that reliably invalidate
impermissible delegations of a non-delegable federal immigration
power (or unauthorized state exercises of it, if it is delegable), and also validate permissible delegations of state authority to take other
kinds of immigration-related actions. And in any case, even if we reject the exclusivity of federal power, the complexity of existing federal immigration law and the foreign relations concerns make it difficult for courts to determine whether state action will interfere
111
sufficiently with the system to violate SPT.
The SPT account thus explains the congressional permission exception regardless of our underlying theory of the exclusivity or
delegability of federal immigration power. In each formulation, the
risk of adjudicatory error in deciding the permissibility of delegations
is high in the marginal case. And, the political branches have long
been regarded as having superior institutional capacity on immigration largely because of immigration’s connection with foreign rela112
tions. Accordingly, courts might reasonably conclude that the best
way to implement SPT is with a rule that counsels deference to the
political branches’ decisions regarding the constitutional permissibility of delegated state authority—e.g., whether the action falls outside
the exclusive part of federal immigration power or, if that part, too, is
107
108

109

110
111
112
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delegable, whether delegating that authority to states is desirable under the circumstances. If there is no exclusive federal immigration
power, the same instrumental considerations nevertheless counsel
judicial deference to the political branches on whether any given delegation of authority to states will interfere with foreign affairs or the
system of immigration law.
Judicial attention to these comparative institutional capacity considerations also may support an SPT-based explanation of the shift in
recent decades from dormancy to preemption analysis in immigra113
tion power cases.
Just as a statutory delegation provision can be
viewed as a signal that a state action is no threat to structural stability
from a better institution; a statutory preemption provision (or substantive provision that conflicts with the challenged state action) can
be viewed as an expertise-backed signal that state action poses a structural threat. Federal immigration statutes and regulations, on this
view, function as another kind of proxy for the more difficult underlying question of state action’s effect on the stability of the system.
Positive federal immigration law crystallizes the scope and contours of federal immigration policymaking discretion. In the light of
Congress’s institutional capacity advantage on immigration, courts
using federal immigration statutes as a proxy for structural interference is a form of deference that responds to relevant instrumental
concerns. Congress has now legislated on so many immigration issues that preemption doctrine will be an available alternative to
straightforward application of SPT in most cases, and preemption
doctrine—detailed and predictable compared to the dormant immigration doctrine—provides a narrower, more determinate, and less
controversial doctrinal mechanism for implementing SPT in this context. And, on the SPT account, the broader dormant immigration
rule could remain a default rule that may invalidate state laws that affect immigration and survive preemption analysis. If state interference is generally barred by SPT, then it might minimize adjudicatory
errors to hold that it cannot survive just because no federal statutory
114
signal on its invalidity can be found. So, too, however, courts might
reasonably come to view the absence of preemptive federal law as a
signal of implied permission from the better-situated institution. As
federal immigration law becomes more comprehensive, state involvement with immigration more common, and calculating geopolit113
114

See infra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
Similar reasoning could explain why the Zschernig doctrine remains on the books and is
still occasionally invoked in the foreign affairs context more generally. See supra notes 31–
5 and accompanying text.
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ical impacts more complicated, it seems increasingly justifiable in
terms of error risks and costs for courts in immigration power cases to
presume that congressional silence on state action affecting matters
with which federal immigration law regularly engages and that are of
significant moment to national stability connotes permission.
An SPT-based account of immigration doctrine is thus preferable
for several reasons. First, it dissolves the need for the kind of complex explanations of the scope of federal exclusivity in immigration
and the corresponding scope of states’ capacity in the field that is required to show that the distinction between immigration selection
and regulation is constitutionally mandatory on the conventional account of the doctrine’s constitutional foundation. It also explains the
exceptions to the general preclusion as incorporating reliable proxies
for violations of SPT. The SPT account unites immigration power
doctrines with the dormant Commerce Clause, admiralty, and foreign
affairs doctrines as judicial rules designed to implement a single,
simply constitutional norm in different ways depending on the pragmatic adjudicatory considerations in each context. Finally—and unlike views that explain exceptions to the general preclusion by hypothesizing that states possess some concurrent immigration power—
the SPT account does not require disregarding a century of judicial
rhetoric about the exclusivity of federal immigration power or the
Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of precisely the proposition that
states possess concurrent authority over immigration. It requires only
that we recognize, as we always have, that states may affect immigration and immigrants in legitimate exercise of their police powers and
that the power matching problem makes it difficult to distinguish legitimate state police power actions from illegitimate encroachments
on federal immigration power.
C. Obstacle Preemption

See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606–10 (1889); Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875).

Immigration is a useful case study for inquiring more broadly
about the conceptual connections between different structural constitutional doctrines—it is a field in which a broad background rule
of dormancy has been for the most part supplanted in practice by the
application of preemption doctrines as positive federal immigration
law has expanded. From what seems to have been a straightforward
application of dormancy rules in cases decided in the nineteenth
115
century, the Court seems to have shifted to a preemption-first ap115
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proach beginning with the seminal 1941 decision in Hines v.
Davidowitz, and continuing through important decisions in Graham v.
116
Richardson, De Canas v. Bica, and Mathews v. Diaz through the most
recent encounter with an immigration power question in Chamber of
117
Commerce v. Whiting.
The dormancy and preemption doctrines accomplish much the same thing—both buttress the stability of the
constitutional system by precluding state interference with what is
taken to be either an exclusively federal power or, if federal exclusivity is not a constitutional necessity, at least a regulatory subject in
which the existence of comprehensive federal regulation means that
state forays into the field raise the specter of interference with federal
policymaking discretion in an area tightly bound up with interna118
tional relations. Keep in mind the conceptual distinction between
preemption and dormancy that I explored at length elsewhere:
Dormancy rules identify state actions that are beyond the states’ constitutional power ex ante; preemption rules, by contrast, identify state
actions that, while otherwise within states’ constitutional authority ex
ante, are nevertheless contingently precluded in virtue of the enact119
ment of a conflicting federal law.
It turns out that the controversial obstacle preemption doctrine
may be characterized as implementing SPT, using state laws’ conflicts
with congressional purpose as a proxy for structural interference with
federal statutes that either play a significant rule in structuring the
government, establish important and long-vested legal rights, or that
have otherwise achieved what we might call quasi-constitutional status. Thus, obstacle preemption, like the immigration power doctrines, is deeply related to the standard dormancy doctrines. This
new justificatory account resolves a prominent critique of obstacle
preemption—that it cannot be properly grounded on the Supremacy
120
Clause.
This account also gives us new leverage on two broader controversies in the literature on preemption: First, courts have never made
clear the constitutional foundation for characterizing judicial
116

117
118
119
120

See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65–66 (1941); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355
(1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81
(1976).
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973–74 (2011).
See supra notes 57–62, 105–111 and accompanying text.
See Pursley, supra note 9, at 561–65 (distinguishing dormancy and preemption while also
discussing contingent unconstitutionality).
See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
“this Court’s [entire body of] ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence” is inherently flawed).
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preemption holdings that have the effect of fully nullifying state law
or, even more extreme, displacing state regulatory authority rather
than simply rendering the challenged state law inapplicable in a par121
ticular case —as one might expect on an intuitive reading of the Supremacy Clause as a choice-of-law rule that would merely render the
122
preempted state law inapplicable in the particular case —and that
123
124
foundation is not obvious. Call this the “displacement” problem.
Second, commentators have been frustrated by the Court’s haphazard
application of the presumption against preemption—a rule that,
when applied, requires an especially salient manifestation of congressional preemptive intent before federal law may be construed to
125
preempt state law. While the Court has stated that the presumption
is grounded on constitutional federalism considerations and has
126
hinted on occasion—consistent with the generality of its rationale —
127
that it applies in every preemption case; it has not applied the presumption in every preemption case and the reasons for its non128
application in some cases have not been explained.
We should begin with some background on preemption, its proposed constitutional grounding, and the nature of the controversies

121

122

123
124

125

126

127

128

See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541–52 (2001) (issuing standard
displacement rhetoric); see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770–71 (1994) (discussing preemption’s effects).
For discussions of this reading of the Supremacy Clause, see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the
Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2088–90 (2000); Gardbaum, supra note 121, at 770–
73; Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 251–52 (2000); Garrick B. Pursley,
Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 524–26 (2010).
See Pursley, supra note 122, at 524–29 (canvassing formulations of this criticism).
Tom Merrill called this effect of preemption decisions “displacement,” as distinguished
from cases in which the preemption holding is essentially a choice of law holding that
does not invalidate the state law beyond the particular case. See Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730–31 (2008).
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing examples of federal
law preempting state law, concluding that “[i]t is often a perplexing question whether
Congress has precluded state action”).
See Young, supra note 43, at 1834–35, 1849–50 (discussing how the “courts were not envisioned [by the Framers] as the primary line of defense” for enforcing federalism and separation of powers).
See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (calling the presumption “a cornerstone[] of our pre-emption jurisprudence”); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77
(2008) (indicating that the presumption applies in all preemption cases).
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (ignoring the presumption in preemption analysis); Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
1131 (2011) (same); see also Merrill, supra note 124, at 728 (noting the Court’s varying
methods of application regarding presumption); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the
Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 307–
08 (2012) (noting the Court’s unreliable use of the presumption).
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See generally Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 251–52 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–24 (2008) (construing express
preemption provisions); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2007)
(same).
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (precluding enforcement of state laws where the federal interest is dominant); Textile Workers Union of Am.
v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 515 (1957) (appendix to Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(referencing a narrow field of legislative action).
E.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48 (holding that because of the preemptive effect of
the Federal Arbitration Act, the court could not affect what the state legislature cannot);
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874–86 (2000) (stating that preemption is a
“question of congressional intent”).
See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (stating that a “party may successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy”).
See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 590 (Thomas, J., concurring) (canvassing formulations).
See, e.g., Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011) (“We have held that state and
federal law conflict where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
See id. at 59–60.

surrounding its development and application.
Preemption doctrines invalidate state actions that conflict with positive federal law in
one of several ways. Express preemption occurs where federal law
contains a provision expressly barring certain existing state laws or
130
categories of existing and potential state laws. Field preemption—
rare but applicable in some narrow circumstances—occurs where
federal law is clearly meant to be the sole source of regulation on a
131
subject or category of activity.
Two forms of implied preemption
may occur even absent express preemption language or evidence that
the federal government sought to occupy the entire field of regula132
tion. First, state laws may be impliedly preempted where they direct133
ly conflict with one or more provisions of positive federal law. The
134
exact test for direct conflicts remains unclear; popular recently has
been the formulation that state law directly conflicts with federal law
where it is impossible for a regulated party to comply with both the
state and federal requirements (hence, this has in recent cases been
135
called “impossibility” preemption). But here, I focus on the other
form of implied conflict preemption—the so-called “obstacle
preemption” rule, which requires the invalidation of state laws that
“stands as an obstacle to the . . . full purposes and objectives of Con136
gress.” Interestingly, this obstacle preemption doctrine was born in
the immigration context—it was first articulated in Hines, an immi137
gration power case.
129
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132
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One prominent objection is that the obstacle preemption doctrine is atextual. In articulating preemption rules, the Supreme
Court unerringly cites the Supremacy Clause as the relevant constitu138
tional foundation. The Clause provides that the “Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United
States” are “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
139
There is a
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
longstanding debate about whether the obstacle preemption doctrine
can be justified by the Supremacy Clause—it is unclear at best that
congressional “purposes and objectives” can render state law “contrary” to federal law and, for that matter, that “purposes and objectives”
140
are “laws of the United States.”
We can place the more controversial preemption doctrines—
especially the obstacle preemption rule—on firmer conceptual footing by characterizing them as implementing SPT rather than the Supremacy Clause; but to do so we must adopt a somewhat broader
conception of the constitutional structure that SPT protects against
141
state interference. First, we might argue that obstacle preemption
is justified where a federal statute is enacted pursuant to arguably exclusive, or at least importantly discretionary, federal authority. Federal immigration statutes, for example, arguably crystallize federal
immigration policymaking discretion—which may be an exclusively
federal discretion—and thus are part of the constitutional structure
in the sense that they constitute what the federal government has decided to do with its immigration power. State interference with these
federal statutes, then, may be characterized as interference with the
constitutional structure insofar as it undermines the exercise of federal discretion. But this proves far too much. On this view, however,
138

139
140

141

See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–41 (2001); Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). More generally, the modern preemption doctrine
began with Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. See 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
For exemplary articulations of this critique, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587–88
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “Congressional and agency musings, however, do not satisfy the Art. I, § 7, requirements for enactment of federal law and, therefore, do not pre-empt state law under the Supremacy Clause”); Bradford R. Clark, Putting
the Safeguards Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REV. 327, 337–38
(2001) (arguing that by permitting agencies to resolve statutory ambiguity shifts the power to preempt state law away from Congress and the President).
Cf. Pursley, supra note 9, at 500, 539 (noting that under the State Preclusion Test, “[s]tate
governments may not take actions that undermine the constitutionally established structure of government of which they are a part”).
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See generally William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215
(2001); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 142, at 1230–46 (listing features of statutes with quasiconstitutional status); Young, supra note 142, at 415–18 (same).

nearly every positive federal law can be characterized as part of the
constitutional structure—we need criteria for limiting what qualifies
as part of the constitutional structure to prevent SPT from becoming
a general prohibition on states doing anything at all.
We might limit the range of positive federal laws that count by introducing some kind of significance criterion—assessing either the
significance of state interference with a given law for the stability of
federal policy or the significance of the head of federal authority under which the law was enacted. Another ready-to-hand criterion of
significance is found in recent constitutional theory work suggesting
that broad, comprehensive federal statutes may become part of the
142
constitutional structure in some sense.
Statutes that create rights
and empower government institutions to elaborate and enforce those
rights through legislative and adjudicatory processes discharge quintessentially constitutional functions. What’s more, long-lived constitutive or rights-bearing statutes of this sort also seem quasiconstitutional because they are entrenched in a sense, not by Article
V, but by the pragmatic factors—including, for example, institutional
settlement and incentives to maintain status quo allocations of administrative jurisdiction, anti-reform pressures from powerful statusquo stakeholders, regulatory endowment effects, and so forth—that
143
make altering significant federal statutes more difficult and costly.
The INA, for example, displays some of these features—it creates
rights and remedies; it has been around for a long time and has generated a large body of institutions and implementing regulations, resulting in strong endowment effects, and so forth. Since SPT is supported in large part by the desire to avoid the practical consequences
of destabilization, it is a natural next step to argue that SPT’s definition of interference with the constitutional structure should be capacious and flexible enough to include interference with statutes that
display these characteristics.
Preemption doctrine thus may be viewed as implementing SPT in
some instances. State actions’ conflicts or interference with federal
statutes can serve as proxies for interference with federal sensitive or
exclusive federal authority—important features of the constitutional
structure. Obstacle preemption in particular seems better explained
on this account; while the doctrine’s focus on Congress’s policy objectives may seem odd because those objectives are not by law within
142
143
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the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, that focus is consistent with an
SPT-based doctrine insofar as Congress’s objectives are directly relevant to determining the extent to which state action threatens to derail a federal policy process crucial for systemic stability. Or, if we
want to take the super-statutes idea more literally, we might say that
certain statutes become elements of the constitutional structure in a
functional sense in virtue of their constitutional characteristics. Doctrine is (ideally) responsive to pragmatic concerns; thus it makes
sense for courts to select doctrines that treat certain federal statutes
as quasi-constitutional. On either view of federal statutes’ role in the
analysis, SPT improves upon the conventional Supremacy Clause explanation of preemption doctrine, which does not straightforwardly
suggest these considerations. The SPT account is thus preferable in
the sense that it provides a new solution—in the form of a new normative grounding—for the “atextuality” critique of obstacle preemption.
Distinguishing federal statutes by their significance or connection
with systemic stability as is suggested by the SPT rationale also better
explains the presumption against preemption’s seemingly haphazard
application in some cases but not others—shifting the focus of the
doctrine from conflict to interference with the larger system suggests
a more nuanced inquiry balancing systemic interests with those of the
states. It stands to reason that state actions conflicting with structurally significant statutes are on balance more likely to violate SPT, thus
the presumption may be inapposite if the balance of structural stability against the federalism values the presumption promotes will reliably favor preemption in such cases. Where the federal statute at issue
is less significant on some measure, however, it might be reasonable
to presume that federalism values will have substantial weight in the
analysis, making application of the presumption pragmatically justifiable.
The SPT view also points out a new clarifying solution to the
common conflation of the “preemption” and “displacement” effects
of preemption holdings. Displacement finds at best contestable justification in the Supremacy Clause; but full displacement of destabilizing state action is exactly what you would expect from decision rules
implementing SPT. The potential for structural interference, after
all, will typically be a quality of the state law in all applications, not
just its application to a particular set of facts. And even if a generally
harmless state law appears to threaten structural stability only in one
or a few particular applications, courts could reasonably opt for a
prophylactic approach attaching the displacement effect to every instance of preemption. If courts occasionally moderate preemption’s
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effect to something closer to the choice-of-law model, the SPT account suggests that in those instances, the state law’s general application could be fairly clearly pronounced harmless. Or, those decisions
might be explained as implementing the Supremacy Clause, which
reads as a choice-of-law rule, provided that the federal law at issue
falls relatively clearly within the Clause’s language. All preemption
doctrines thus may implement SPT in a sense—that is, SPT can, if it
forms part of the normative background for preemption doctrine, finally justify the displacement effects. It’s easy to view preemption as a
decision rule that leverages a useful proxy—the content of positive
federal law—to replace a harder inquiry into state laws’ effects on the
constitutional structure. If all preemption doctrine is, in this sense,
aimed at preventing state interference, then it’s a form of SPT implementation. The Supremacy Clause precludes one particular form
of state interference, but there are many other ways states can undermine the structure.
The super-statute idea is simply another way of characterizing
what appears to be a judicial inquiry into the importance of either
the federal statute as a policy matter, the specificity of the federal interest in uniformity or in the statute’s particular subject relative to
other regulatory subjects, or the significance of the obstacle posed by
state law, balanced against the degree of state interest in the putatively preempted law. A judicial finding that the statute implicates significant federal interests will in most cases emphasize statutory characteristics that would lead theorists to characterize it as a super-statute.
And that finding (or the scholarly characterization), on my view, is in
turn a proxy for the threat to structural stability posed by state interference. Thus, the super-statute account functions here as little more
than a simplifying explanatory framework that we might superimpose
on the typical analysis in obstacle preemption cases. The case for obstacle preemption doctrine implementing SPT does not, in any sense,
turn on the plausibility of the super-statute account.
* * * * * *
These SPT examples demonstrate the potential fruitfulness of
constructing explanatory accounts that characterize complex constitutional doctrine as predicated on normative propositions that are
significantly more general and abstract than are those proposed in
conventional accounts, and that are thus likely to be matters of substantial and durable consensus among legal officials and the public.
Now suppose that such an account could be expanded, with the addition of no more than a handful of other SPT-like norms, to explain
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I am leaving the rights side of constitutional doctrine and practice aside for now. While I
believe that similar reconceptualizations of constitutional rights doctrines are possible,
they will be harder, more controversial, and perhaps less useful on the rights side. The
structural focus seems preliminarily more fruitful, since there are very few specific structural prohibitions in the constitutional text.
But cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1803–
06 (2005) (arguing that sociological acceptance of constitutional norms supports their
moral legitimacy).
John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 209–10 (2001) (“Agreeing that a norm is legally valid is not incompatible with holding that it is entirely worthless
. . . .”).
See supra notes 10–24 and accompanying text.
See Pursley, supra note 9, at 504.

most structural constitutional doctrine. In Parts II and III, I assume
that such an account—the SN account of structural constitutional
doctrine—is possible and explore the implications; first developing a
theoretical framework for assessing the merits of SN relative to conventional explanatory accounts and then arguing that pursuing accounts like SN may advance constitutional theory by reconciling it
with legal positivism and moving it past the preoccupation with debates about constitutional interpretation.
Importantly, the claims that constitutional norms can be identified in this way, and (as I argue in the next Part) that the aptness of
such identifications can be evaluated by normatively inert criteria, do
not require the conclusion that other normative criteria are inapplicable to the norms. It is not, in other words, an argument in favor of
the norms’ moral validity, their compatibility with democracy, or
145
their compatibility with conventional rule-of-law values.
Those debates can—and should!—still be had, they are just not the debates
146
that I take up here.
Instead, my argument is in favor of these
norms’ legal validity—that is, their status as legal norms qua legal. So,
too, my approach to identifying certain constitutional norms does not
entail or imply any theory of adjudication. Indeed, the underlying
distinction between constitutional operative propositions and consti147
tutional decision rules, and to corollary observation that decision
148
rules are influenced by instrumental as well as legal considerations,
highlights the possibility that multiple categories of non-legal reasons
might be legitimately relied on by courts in constitutional adjudication. One might respond to this view by adopting a theory of adjudication that instructs courts to prioritize or deprioritize deep consensus norms, but any reason to do so—even if it is some reason directly
related to the fact that they are matters of deep consensus (such as,
for example, an argument that deep consensus is more consistent
with democratic values than, say, original intent as a criteria of legal
144

145

146

147
148
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validity) is analytically distinct from the reasons I offer for thinking
that these norms are, in fact, valid constitutional norms of our sys149
tem.
II. EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY CLAIMS
This kind of explanatory account of constitutional doctrine raises
a number of second-order questions. In this Part I address questions
of theory classification and evaluation. There are multiple competing
constitutional theories and there is room for debate about how we
should categorize their various theses. Two important questions that
bear directly on this project are (1) how—by what criteria—should
we assess competing constitutional theories and, relatedly, (2) are
there categories of constitutional theories that should be subjected to
different sets of evaluative criteria? Both questions arise from an
150
even more basic one—“which theory is best?”
To address these
questions, I first propose a rough taxonomy of constitutional theories—divided into theories of law and theories of adjudication, follow151
ing the traditional distinction in jurisprudence; and into positive
and normative theories following the convention of most disciplines.
These distinctions illuminate the difficult question of how we should
evaluate competing theories of various kinds. I argue that while the
conventional way of assessing a constitutional theory, which involves
normative criteria of political morality and the like, is apt for theories
152
of adjudication, but problematic for positive theories of law. Theories of law should be evaluated according to criteria that help us
choose between competing claims about what is the case. Accordingly, I propose a set of evaluative criteria for positive constitutional the-

149
150
151

152

See Gardner, supra note 146, at 211–12.
Fallon, supra note 14, at 540.
See Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 552 (noting this distinction’s commonality in jurisprudence); see also SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 247–48 (2011) (same). No categorization
is airtight. See Berman & Toh, supra, at 553–54 (arguing that “new originalism” advances
claims belonging to both a theory of law and a theory of adjudication); Fallon, supra note
14, at 544–45 (noting that categorizing constitutional theories is not to “define polar opposites so much as regions along a continuum”). The test of a conceptual distinction is
its utility. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision
Rules: Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMM. 39, 45–47 (2010)
(rejecting certain arguments that could be made to defend the “two output thesis” because they would result in denying its utility).
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 14, at 538 (arguing generally that the criteria for selecting
among competing constitutional theories “must reflect a judgment about which theory
would yield the best outcomes, as measured against relevant criteria”).
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ory-of-law claims that tracks the dominant views about theory assess153
ment and selection in jurisprudence and the philosophy of science.
This taxonomy makes clear that the view I am defending here is a
theory-of-law thesis whose compatibility with legal positivism is another of its theoretical virtues. I explore this in Part III.A. And in Part
III.B, I argue that a constitutional theory of law of this kind can help
us avoid the implications of the inescapably normative and seemingly
unresolvable contest among proponents of competing theories of
constitutional interpretation.
A. Constitutional Theory Taxonomy
154

Constitutional theories are many and varied. For our purposes,
it is most useful to first distinguish theories of law from theories of adjudi155
cation. By a theory of law, I mean an account of the content of the
law—that is, an account that answers the question “what is the law” in
jurisdiction X or why is it the case that is a legal norm and not some
156
other kind of norm (a moral rule, a rule of etiquette, etc.). Because
157
law is a socially constructed artifact of human practice, not a natural
kind with a “distinctive micro-constitution[ ]”—water or gold, for example, have distinctive molecular structures by which we can distin158
guish them from other natural phenomena —it is difficult to give an
153
154

155

156

157

158

Accord Leiter, supra note 19, at 1239 (borrowing from this literature to assess legal theory
claims).
For a broad sampling of the larger works, see generally Larry Alexander, Constitutional
Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique (Madison Lecture), Univ. of San Diego Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-120 (June 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2277790 (last viewed Jan. 31, 2014).
See Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 550–52 (exploring this distinction); see also Michael
Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917–18 (2005)
(distinguishing theories of law from theories of adjudication); Leiter, supra note 8, at
866–67 (categorizing jurisprudential claims on this dimension and discussing at length
why the distinction matters).
See Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 550 (noting that theories of interpretation must “presuppose an account of what the law is or consists of”); id. at 552 (defining theories of law
as “theories of the ultimate criteria of legal validity, or of the ultimate determinants of legal content—i.e., theories regarding what it is that gives the law in any given jurisdiction
the content that it has”).
Langlinais & Leiter, supra note 13, at 5; see also Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (1996) (reviewing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d.
ed. 1994)) (“According to [Hart], that there is law at all follows wholly from the development of human society, a development that is intelligible to us, and the content of particular legal systems is a consequence of what people in history have said and done.”).
Leiter, supra note 16, at 4 (contrasting “natural kinds” and “human artifacts” by showing
that natural kinds have inherent characteristics, while human artifacts “can be made of
almost anything”); see also Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New
Case for Skepticism, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 663, 666–67 (2011) [hereinafter De-
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account of the necessary or essential conditions that must be present
159
Among other problems, the
in order to be a proposition of law.
conditions under which the proposition will in fact be a proposition
of law will vary by jurisdiction and, perhaps, by area of legal practice
160
within a given jurisdiction. Accordingly, the focus of theories of law
is on the criteria of legal validity—the conditions under which Θ will
be a proposition of law and not something else—that obtain within a
161
jurisdiction Y. Or, more ambitiously, some theorists aim for a general theory of law that tells us something generally true about criteria
of legal validity, and thus about the content of the law, in every jurisdiction. Claims belonging to theories of law tend to take the following form:
Propositions whose content satisfies conditions α and φ are propositions
of law in jurisdiction Y.

marcation] (distinguishing law as an artifact that “cannot be individuated by [its] natural
properties,” in contrast with “natural phenomena like ‘water,’ which just is H20”).
See Langlinais & Leiter, supra note 13, at 5–7, 9 (characterizing law as socially constructed); Leiter, supra note 16, at 4–9 (considering and rejecting the idea that an artifact’s essential or necessary conditions may consist in some description of their functions (because functions are variable according to the observer’s intentions, etc.) or the intentions
of their creators (since law, on the positivist account, needs no creator or, where it has a
creator, needs no creator intentions to be law)).
E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75
MICH. L. REV. 473, 487 (1977) (distinguishing “the verbal formulation of a standard” from
“the standard’s purpose” and contemplating which is actually the law); Jules L. Coleman
& Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 228, at 237 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (noting that the content of rules of
recognition may and almost certainly do vary from one legal system to another).
Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 552 (emphasizing the centrality of criteria of legal validity
to theories of law); Leiter, supra note 16, at 2 (characterizing legal positivism, a general
theory of law, as “a view that explains the crucial question that arises about law: namely,
how do we determine which norms in any society are norms of the legal system, that is,
norms that are ‘legally valid’”).
See Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 558–59 (noting certain originalist claims in which
“originalism clearly serves as a theory of law”).
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 15, at 552.

The primary contribution of theories of law is to describe, and thereby illuminate, the criteria of legal validity—conditions X and Z.
Professors Mitchell Berman and Kevin Toh characterize some
162
“new” originalist claims as belonging to a theory of law —for example, Steven Calabresi and Sai Prakash’s claim that “[o]riginalists do
not give priority to the plain dictionary meaning of the Constitution’s
text because they like grammar more than history. They give priority
163
to it because they believe that it and it alone is law.” On this view,
“insofar as judges should follow or enforce some fixed original aspect
of the constitutional text, they should do so because that fixed as-

159

160

161

162
163
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pect—‘the plain dictionary meaning’ in [Calabresi and Prakash’s
164
formulation]—is the law.” Perhaps the most famous general theory
of law is the positivist account that H.L.A. Hart articulated in his sem165
inal work The Concept of Law.
I set out Hart’s core claims in more
detail in the next Part; for now, summarizing Hart’s core thesis is
166
enough to show that his is a theory of law—viz.:
In any legal system, the legal validity of any given norm depends on
whether it comports with criteria of legal that a consensus of the system’s
167
legal officials accept as obligatory.

This is aptly called Hart’s “social fact” or “conventionality” thesis because the operative criteria of legal validity in any system, which constitutes that system’s ultimate “Rule of Recognition” in Hart’s terms,
may be identified by patterns of convergent official practice suggest168
ing criteria that are accepted by broad consensus as obligatory.
169
Hart characterized his view as one of “descriptive” sociology —he
sought to give a general account of law on which the concept of law is
exhausted by facts about the practices of participants in municipal le170
gal systems.
Contrast theories of law with theories of adjudication, which describe or prescribe how officials—usually judges—do or should re171
solve disputes under law.
The American Legal Realists’ theory of
adjudication, developed in the first part of the Twentieth Century,
was that “judges respond primarily to the facts of the case” such that
legal reasons have less to do with causing judicial outcomes than was

164
165
166
167

168
169
170
171

Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 559 (emphasis added).
See HART, supra note 16, at vi (describing his goal for the book as “further[ing] the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related social phenomena”).
See also Leiter, supra note 16, at 3 (listing this as one of positivism’s core claims).
See HART, supra note 16, at 32, 94–95, 100–10. Raz argues that legal systems can have
more than one rule of recognition, and that only the “ultimate” rule of recognition need
be a social rule. JOSEPH RAZ, The Identity of Legal Systems, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 78,
95–96 (1979); see also infra note 267 (discussing positivism’s other core claim, the “source
thesis”).
HART, supra note 16, at 92.
Id. at 240.
See Leiter, supra note 16, at 9–11 (discussing positivism’s objectives).
Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 552 (explaining that theories of law “are theories of the
ultimate criteria of legal validity,” while theories of constitutional adjudication “are theories of what judges should do in a course of resolving legal disputes”); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1144 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY
SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)) (“Whereas positivism is a
theory of law, formalism is a theory of adjudication, a theory about how judges actually do decide cases and/or a theory about how they ought to decide them.”).
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conventionally assumed.
Political and legal theorists involved in
modern projects like the construction of the attitudinal model of
judging that measures the extent to which judicial decisions can be
predicted according to observable proxies for the judges’ political
173
leanings. Normative theories of adjudication are more common—
two well-recognized examples are Ronald Dworkin’s view that judges
should engage in “constructive interpretation,” rendering decisions
that both fit existing legal materials and render them morally justifia174
ble; and John Hart Ely’s view that constitutional adjudication
should focus on shoring up failings of the political process so that the
175
latter can do the lion’s share of the governing.
A theory of constitutional interpretation is a particular kind of
theory of adjudication—a sort of “theory of legal or constitutional
epistemology” that “aim[s] to give guidance regarding how to conduct a particular inquiry” to discover the legally effective meaning of
176
the constitutional law applicable to some dispute.
Classical
originalism, for example, instructs courts how to go about determin177
ing what the authors of constitutional provisions intended to say;
their background assumption about the content of law being that the
content of “the constitutional law in a case of first judicial impression
is fully determined by what the authors of the constitutional text in-

172

173

174

175
176

177

See BRIAN LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15, 21–25 (2007).
See Leiter, supra note 8, at 873–74 (characterizing the attitudinal model a positive theory
of adjudication). See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUDGES MAKE
(1998) (noting the limited influence of strategic accounts of the Court’s decisionmaking); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (using the scientific model to analyze the Supreme Court).
DWORKIN, supra note 14, ch. 10; Leiter, supra note 8, at 876 (characterizing Dworkin’s
constructive interpretation as a theory of adjudication—“[a]lthough Dworkin claims to be
describing what judges actually do—‘the hidden structure of their judgments,’ as he
says—his theory is quite explicitly driven by a normative vision . . . . [U]nless judges are
deciding cases on the Dworkinian method of constructive interpretation, their decisions
could not supply a moral justification for coercing the losing party before the court”).
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980).
See Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 550–52. It is worth noting the distinction between the
semantic and legal meaning of a text, which is of some importance in internecine debates
among originalists. Most acknowledge that legal meaning may not be identical with semantic meaning; see id. at 548–49 (discussing this distinction and “the tendency of legal
theorists to conflate semantic facts with legal facts”).
See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the goal of constitutional interpretation is to “discover the
meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people who
adopted [the Constitution]”).
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tended to say.”
This is distinct from a theory of law—to instruct
courts how to discover the proper legal meaning of the governing law
presupposes “an account of what the law is or consists of”—as it must,
in order to guide courts toward the proper legal meaning of the con179
stitutional law and not some other set of norms. Some theories of
interpretation arguably now include, alongside their epistemological
guidance, “theory of law” claims—as with New Originalism men180
tioned above —but while they may be loosely grouped under the
same heading for hanging together as a more or less thematically re181
lated set of views, these kinds of claims are conceptually distinct.
182
The two-output thesis, for example, belongs to a theory of adjudication but not to a theory of constitutional interpretation; the process
of generating constitutional operative propositions may but need not
183
involve the application of a theory of constitutional interpretation,
and the formulation of constitutional decision rules involves a distinct operation, which has come to be called constitutional “construc184
tion.”
A second important distinction is between positive and normative
theoretical claims. Positive theories aim to explain or reveal what is
the case in the actual world; prescriptive theories aim to demonstrate
that some set of facts or some condition should be the case or would
be the case in some possible world that is more desirable than the actual world. Hart’s theory of law is positive—“[i]t does not provide
178
179
180
181

182
183

184

Berman & Toh, supra note 6, at 551.
Id. at 550.
See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
Berman & Toh, supra note 151, at 553. On “new” originalism, see generally KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2009); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1085 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 923, 944 (2009).
See supra notes 10–24 and accompanying text; see also Berman, supra note 21, at 221 (labeling this claim the “two output thesis”).
See Berman, supra note 10, at 57–58 & n.192 (emphasizing that the two-output thesis presupposes no particular theory of constitutional interpretation); see also Berman & Toh,
supra note 6, at 553 (noting that new originalists have latched on to constitutional decision rules but that advancing the two output thesis does not commit one to originalism).
Berman, supra note 151 (canvassing uses of the term “constitutional construction” and
concluding that it increasingly refers to decision rule formulation); see also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) (adopting
the notion of construction); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 490–92 (2013) (discussing originalists’ view of constitutional construction in relation to Berman’s notion of decision rules); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–21 (2010)
(describing constitutional construction).
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any guidance at all on what anyone should do about anything on any
185
occasion.” Moralistic theories of law—e.g., natural law theories like
186
that of John Finnis —are normative insofar as they claim that we can
identify what the law actually is only by evaluating putative legal
propositions on some moral criterion. Most theories of adjudication
are normative—although there are some notable exceptions such as
the positive claims of the American Legal Realists and, more recently,
187
the attitudinal modelers —but not all normative constitutional theories are exclusively theories of adjudication. Some also make claims
belonging to a theory of law, such as the originalist claim mentioned
188
above; Ernest Young’s contention that some statutes gain (or
should be said to gain) constitutional status when they discharge con189
stitutional functions; or popular constitutionalist claims that consti190
tutional law corresponds in some way with public views.
The State Preclusion Thesis account and Skeletal Norms depend
on the two-output thesis as a positive claim about constitutional adjudication, but my central claim is that we should consider whether patterns of convergent official practice in constitutional matters are evidence of the norms that are valid constitutional norms in our system,
and perhaps of part of the content of our rule of recognition. This
claim belongs to a positive theory of law; thus in discussing criteria
for evaluating constitutional theory claims, I will focus on developing
evaluative criteria that will be useful for assessing claims of this sort.

185
186
187

188
189
190

Gardner, supra note 146, at 202 (characterizing legal positivism’s core claim as “normatively inert”).
See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011) (introducing ethics,
political philosophy, and jurisprudence).
On the Realists, see BRIAN LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15, 23 (2007) (describing the American Legal Realists’ “core claim”—that “judges respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts of the case”
in deciding outcomes—as a positive, social scientific thesis about adjudication). For examples of modern positive theories of adjudication, see FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 3–4 (2007) (surveying modern empirical work on
the real causes of judicial decisions); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 173, at 123 (evidencing
the proposition that judicial decisions are better explained and predicted by rough proxies for judges’ political attitudes than analysis of the legal reasons at issue in the cases).
See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
See Young, supra note 142, at 416.
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367–
68 (2009); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
7–8 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
181–82 (1999).
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
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Constitutional theory does not have much of a literature on theo191
ry assessment, and what there is primarily proposes assessing competing theories according to values that are at stake in constitutional
debates. Richard Fallon, for example, argues that “the choice among
theories should be based on which theory will best advance shared,
though vague and sometimes competing, goals of: (1) satisfying the
requirements of the rule of law, (2) preserving fair opportunity for
majority rule under a scheme of political democracy, and (3) promoting substantive justice by protecting a morally and politically accepta192
ble set of individual rights.”
This is simply a different question to
ask about constitutional theories, one with no necessary relationship
to my question about explanatory accuracy. And applying normative
criteria internal to constitutional practice to choose between positive
theories of law is question-begging; after all, the goal of such theories
is to provide an accurate picture of what the constitutional law is, and
theorists tend to claim that something in our constitutional law is the
source of the values that form the basis for these proposed normative
193
assessments.
This kind of normative assessment may be unavoidable in constitutional theory (the discipline is, after all, dominated by
194
normative work), but I doubt it. The relative paucity of positive
constitutional theory in the legal literature might tell us something
about the scholarly community’s implicit assessment of such work’s
value; but more likely, I think, it tells us something about what consti195
tutional scholars find interesting, and in any case it does not establish
that positive theory is either impossible or undesirable.

191

192
193

194
195

See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 16, at 3–5 (deploying a set of theory selection criteria for assessing competing claims in general jurisprudence); W. Bradley Wendel, Explanation in
Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure of Doctrinal Legal Analysis, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1035, 1041–42 (2011) (exploring theory selection criteria for legal theory generally).
Fallon, supra note 14, at 538–39.
See id. at 551 (“Questions about appropriate evaluative criteria for constitutional theories
arise within the same debates in which those criteria are invoked.”); see also Michael C.
Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 598 (1999) (“Any claim
that some set of [normative] priorities and [relative] weights [among such priorities] is
best is itself a highly contestable claim of constitutional theory.”).
See Fallon, supra note 14, at 540–41 (arguing that choosing a constitutional theory “requires appeal to normative criteria”).
Cf. Gardner, supra note 146, at 203 (“When a philosopher of law asserts a proposition that
neither endorses nor criticizes what they do, but only identifies some necessary feature of
what they do, lawyers and law teachers are often frustrated. They automatically start to
search for hidden notes of endorsement or criticism, secret norms that they are being
asked to follow.”).
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Normative constitutional theory is clearly distinct from scientific
theory—the latter purports to explain what is the case while the former purports to demonstrate what should be made the case. Positive
constitutional theory, which does purport to reveal what is the case, is
also distinct from scientific theory: Law is not a natural kind, it is an
196
Among other things, human
artifact created by human practice.
practices and their artifacts may change over time while physical
phenomena (for the most part and excepting quantum mechanical
phenomena) remain fixed regardless of human observation or action. Moreover, the object of positive constitutional theory—
constitutional practice—is a notoriously difficult, moving target; for
example, “a number of interpretive paradigms can coexist peacefully
in constitutional practice, and no one paradigm is likely to force the
197
others out of business.”
Even if some of our constitutional norms
can be clearly identified, then, it is very difficult to use that information to predict practical outcomes in the light of the widely varying
approaches observable in constitutional practice under which constitutional norms may be given legal effect in constitutional disputes.
For these reasons, among others, two typical scientific theory evalua198
199
tion criteria—falsifiability and predictive power —seem inapt for
200
choosing among positive constitutional theory claims.
196
197
198

199

200

See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 259, 272 (2013).
A scientific proposition is falsifiable if a statement about some occurrence is incompatible
with the proposition. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 44, 86–87
(1968); KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 150–75
(1972).
See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 7–9 (1953) (arguing that the principal, perhaps only, proper test of a positive
economic theory should be its predictive power).
Although they are routinely referenced in legal theory literature, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 355 n.17 (2001), there is
debate in the philosophy of science about the propriety of predictive power and falsification as criteria for evaluating scientific theories. Popper’s views have been for the most
part abandoned by mainstream philosophers of science. See, e.g., Susan Haack, Federal
Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction—and a Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 394,
415–16 (2010). Thomas Kuhn, for example, does not include falsifiability on his list of
five criteria for choosing among scientific theories. See KUHN, supra note 12, at 321–22.
One problem with falsifiability as a test for positive legal theory claims is the following:
Assuming that constitutional norms are meaningfully constituted (validated) by patterns
of convergent official practice of acceptance; then for claims of the form “Θ is a constitutional norm in legal system X,” potentially falsifying counterexamples (e.g., a judicial decision in which the court upholds some state action that pretty clearly threatens structural
stability) could be interpreted as either (1) proof that Θ is not in fact a norm of the system; or (2) evidence that Θ was (or perhaps still is) a norm of the system but that the official consensus that Θ is a norm is changing or has changed. It is not obvious how—
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absent explicit and credible judicial specification—we should decide between these two
interpretations. Even an unambiguous judicial statement that it has never been a valid
norm would not decisively falsify the SPT claim; current judges cannot be certain about
what earlier judges accepted as obligatory.
This is a matter of serious debate in the scientific and philosophical communities; I am
assuming that our positive constitutional theory claims can aspire to an accurate approximation of reality. See generally Wendel, supra note 191, at 1060–62 (canvassing this debate).
See KUHN, supra note 12, at 320–21; Bartrum, supra note 197, at 269; Wendel, supra note
191, at 1051–52.
See supra note 200 (discussing the controversy surrounding Popper’s views).
Wendel, supra note 191, at 1059–60 (citing ROBERT NOLA & HOWARD SANKEY, THEORIES
OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 55–56, 74–77, 341–42 (2007)); see also CARL G. HEMPEL, The Logic
of Functional Analysis, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 297, 304 (1965).
KUHN, supra note 12, at 320–22; see Leiter, supra note 16, at 9–13 (applying some of these
criteria to legal theory choice).
Bartrum, supra note 197, at 264; Fallon, supra note 14, at 538–39; see also Barry Friedman,
The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 149–50 (2004).

Thomas Kuhn argues that there is not an objectively correct set of
scientific theory selection criteria—because there is debate about
whether scientific theories actually disclose truths about the world; we
say that they approximate truths about reality, and these theory selection criteria are meant to identify the likely more accurate approxi201
Accordingly, in science, theories are
mation among competitors.
evaluated on criteria that are broadly considered appropriate in the
202
light of the general characteristics and aims of science as a practice.
There is some debate about what distinguishes science from other
203
forms of inquiry; but it seems uncontroversial to suggest that science as a practice “avoids appeals to final causes, vital forces, or general bunkum[,] . . . answer[s] to criteria of empirical adequacy[,]”
and makes claims that are “general, capable of supporting counterfactuals, and above all . . . that purport to be true or false with reference to something external; that is, science must relate to the natural
204
world. . . .” Given these aims, it is unsurprising that criteria for theory selection that enjoy broad and long-lived consensus support
among scientists include accuracy, simplicity, consilience (or explanatory power/capacity), conservatism (or consistency with other wellaccepted views about the world), and potential fruitfulness for future
205
There appears to be no such consensus with respect to
research.
the propriety of the various normative criteria proposed for choosing
206
among constitutional theory claims. If robust consensus on theory
selection is the best approximation of objectivity available, there is
substantially more robust consensus with respect to the criteria I have
mentioned for distinguishing scientific, social scientific, and positive

201

202
203
204

205
206
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constitutional theory claims—enough consensus for Kuhn to suggest
that scientific theory selection decisions on these criteria can, over
207
time, approach objectivity. Theories may fare differently along different dimensions, and it there is no consensus as to the weight that
should be accorded, say, simplicity relative to conservatism; but it
seems reasonable at least to think that theories may compensate for
208
failure on some dimensions with success on others.
Identifying what the law is may require the application of some
moral, economic, historical, or other interpretive or evaluative criterion currently argued by some to be relevant to identifying the legal
norms that we have; but whether such criteria must be so applied is
209
one of the core disputes between competing theories of law. If we
want to evaluate positive constitutional theory claims according to
how well they discharge the aim of disclosing what is the case about
law; then the general theory selecting criteria developed in the philosophy of science for application to other theories that aim to dis210
close what is the case are preferable.
This is not to deny that the

207
208
209

210

See KUHN, supra note 12, at 325 (noting that the choice between competing theories “depends on a mixture of objective and subjective factors”).
See id. at 327–29 (noting this relative weighting problem).
I want to move away from the view that legal theory’s “characteristics and virtues,”
Wendel, supra note 191, at 1059–60, are exclusively bound up with certain values of political morality—say democracy or justice. See supra notes 192–195 and accompanying text.
Cf. Fallon, supra note 14, at 538–41 (arguing that legalistic values bear on legal theory
choice); Wendel, supra note 191, at 1061–64 (noting problems with this view).
See KUHN, supra note 12, at 327–329 (arguing that theory selection criteria in science are
properly drawn by theorists based on their perception of the objectives of the relevant inquiry); Bartrum, supra note 197, at 269 (suggesting the Kuhnian approach for legal theory selection); see also Leiter, supra note 16, at 9–13 (applying scientific theory selection criteria to compare legal positivism to natural law theories and Dworkin’s theory). This is
not to assert something like “Langdell’s widely mocked claim that law can be treated as a
science.” Wendel, supra note 191, at 1064. Instead, I carefully qualify this analysis to reflect the deep uncertainty surrounding the basic ideas of knowledge and explanation in
science. I am using the language of the inference to the best explanation approach to
theory-building and explanation, rather than anything like a hypothetico-deductivist approach, to avoid vexed debates in the philosophy of science about the logical possibility
of confirmation, whether science creates knowledge, and so forth. For this reason, I also
set aside the philosophically difficult question of what an “explanation” really is. For an
overview of these debates, see HEMPEL, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, in ASPECTS OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION, supra note 204 (examining the hypothetico-deductivist method
of confirming proposed explanatory hypotheses with empirical evidence); CARL G.
HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 5–8 (1966) (canvassing problems with deductive models of scientific explanation); NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 204, at 335–45 (canvassing the realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science); Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88, 88 (1965); Paul R. Thagard, The Best
Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76, 76–77 (1978).
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process of assessing competing theories is inherently normative —of
course it is, but limiting normative claims to the second-order question of which theory selection criteria we should adopt (and not,
therefore, extending it to the first-order question of which theory we
should select) avoids conflating the question what makes a good theory of law with the question what values does law serve or reflect—
after all, the latter is one question that theories of law seek to an212
swer. The choice here is between theories holding that the content
of the law is only that which accords with some value proposition or
interpretive methodology, on the one hand, and SN, on which we
recognize both norms constituted by deep patterns of convergent official practice and norms validated according to value or interpretive
213
criteria as parts of the Constitution, on the other.
First, simpler explanations are preferable to more complex ones,
214
all else equal. In arguing that legal positivism is preferable to alternative theories of law including natural law theory and Dworkin’s
“law as integrity” account, Brian Leiter highlights positivism’s “ontological austerity,” or its capacity to explain phenomena “in ways that
do not involve unnecessary, controversial or incredible metaphysical
215
commitments.”
SN is simpler than conventional theories in two
senses illustrated by the SPT account of the standard dormancy doctrines, immigration doctrine, and obstacle preemption doctrine.
First, positing a single structural norm to explain all these doctrines is
ontologically simpler than conventional accounts that posit multiple
216
distinctive norms, perhaps one for each line of doctrine.
In this
same sense, SPT explains immigration doctrine more simply than,
217
say, the external sovereignty rationale; and obstacle preemption
211
212

213

214
215
216
217

See KUHN, supra note 12, at 321–22; Bartrum, supra note 197, at 269; Wendel, supra note
191, at 1064–65.
Compare DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 190 (arguing that any account of the concept of law
must “explain how what it takes to be law provides a general justification for the exercise
of coercive power by the state”), with HART, supra note 16, at 239–40 (arguing that a general theory of law need “not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the
forms and structures which appear in my general account of law”).
Acknowledging the possibility of both merit-based and merit-neutral criteria of legal validity is neutral as between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. See infra note 267 (discussing hard and soft positivism).
KUHN, supra note 12, at 321–22.
Leiter, supra note 158, at 12.
See Pursley, supra note 9, at 530–32 (discussing the simplicity advantage of the SPT account of the dormancy doctrines).
See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (articulating the external sovereignty rationale for federal immigration power); see also Cleveland, supra note
57, at 253 (discussing and criticizing the “inherent powers” of sovereignty justification for
immigration doctrine).
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See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text (rehearsing critiques of existing justifications for preemption doctrine).
See KUHN, supra note 12, at 322 (explaining that good scientific theories can seem to conflict with one another when applied); Thagard, supra note 12, at 79; see also Leiter, supra
note 19, at 1239–40 (applying consilience to assess legal positivism versus competing theories of law).
Leiter, supra note 19, at 1239.
See id. at 1239 (emphasizing explanatory power as a desideratum for positive legal theories); see also DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 65–68 (emphasizing the importance of explanatory “fit” for accounts of constitutional law and practice); Fallon, supra note 14, at 549
(“[I]t appears to be agreed all around . . . that one important criterion is ‘fit.’ A good
constitutional theory must fit either the written Constitution or surrounding practice.”).
See Thagard, supra note 12, at 79 (noting that a “theory is more consilient than another if it
explains more classes of facts than the other”).
Wendel, supra note 191, at 1052.

doctrine more simply than the conventional Supremacy Clause ex218
planation. Second, positing a consensus based constitutional norm
like SPT is more analytically austere than, say, a value-based account
that posits additional, contestable rule-of-law or social justice principles to justify the norms that ground these doctrines, which would
require a distinct normative case to be made for each line of decisions. Similarly, SN is in this sense simpler than interpretive theory
alternatives—SN posits norms acceptable across interpretive views
and explains the shape of doctrine according to pragmatic factors; it
does not require the complex interpretive moves that, say, an
originalist account would require.
A second generally accepted criterion is consilience, which is
about how much of the relevant phenomena the competing theories
219
are capable of explaining: “We prefer more comprehensive explanations—explanations that make sense of more different kinds of
things—to explanations that seem too narrowly tailored to one kind
220
of datum.”
Everyone agrees that theory must fit the phenomena
under consideration—it cannot have explanatory power if it does not
221
explain anything.
But among competing theories that roughly fit
some aspects of the relevant phenomena, the consilience inquiry
222
shifts to how many phenomena the theories explain, respectively.
So, for example, “Darwin’s theory of natural selection was able to account for observations that initially seemed unrelated, such as those
pertaining to anatomy (the presence of vestigial organs) and zoology
(the observed differences in related species);” and thus is more
223
consilient than alternatives that cannot explain these phenomena.
The SPT view explains at once a variety of doctrines that alternative
accounts typically characterize as based on several different constitutional norms (and thus as in this sense unrelated). A built-out theory
218
219

220
221

222
223
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like SN would ex hypothesi explain a great deal more, perhaps most
structural doctrine. Moreover, the interpretive and value neutrality
of SN means that it explains doctrines and judicial decisions that
proponents of value-based or interpretive theories would have to
characterize as non-lawful—for example, it explains why, despite the
protestations of originalists that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not legitimately derived from the original meaning of the
224
Constitution, courts continue to apply the doctrine and other gov225
ernment officials systematically behave as though it is valid law.
226
Originalists advancing a theory of law claim would have to maintain
that the many judges who appear to accept the validity of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in its current form are either
mistaken about what the constitutional law is or are intentionally dis227
Accuracy—a theory’s capacity to explain actual
regarding the law.
228
observations—is a closely related criterion. The thin-norms view also explains distinctions that legal practitioners and scholars make in
everyday talk between, say, what the law is and what the law should
be; value-based or interpretive theories of law cannot capture this dis224

225

226
227

228

See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260, 263 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (attacking the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine because “[t]he historical record provides no grounds for reading the
Commerce Clause to be other than what it says—an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce”).
Similarly, if we hypothesized a converse norm—the National Preclusion Thesis (“NPT”),
viz.: the national government may not take actions that undermine the constitutional
structure—to explain the anticommandeering doctrine, New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 161–63 (1992), and other federalism doctrines, then strict textualists might object that these doctrines have no textual foundation. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism
and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2067
(2009). The NPT account, however, better explains the realities of practice in which these federalism doctrines continue to be applied and are treated as legally valid by most officials.
See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
Some originalists appear to embrace this consequence of their views and argue that nonoriginalist precedent should be disregarded. See generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994) (discussing different approaches to interpreting and using precedent as a guide); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005) (discussing the
impact of stare decisis on originalist theory). But this is hardly a consensus position
among originalists. See Leiter, supra note 19, at 1225–26 (discussing error theoretic accounts in philosophy, and noting that “[a] standing puzzle about [such] accounts is why a
particular discourse persists when all its judgments are false”). See generally John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U.L. REV.
803 (2009) (canvassing the debate and arguing that originalism can be reconciled with
stare decisis).
See KUHN, supra note 12, at 320 (explaining the common scientific approach to adopting
a new theory); see also Wendel, supra note 191, at 1054 (calling the extent to which competing theories “account for observed phenomena” their “empirical adequacy”).
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tinction insofar as they hold that the law is only that which is consistent with the very interpretive theory or value criterion that answers
229
Moreover, the thin-norms theory can exthe “should” question.
plain, in a manner that competing theories cannot, an even larger
and in some senses more obvious phenomenon: the stability and durability of the constitutional system despite various apparently deep
disagreements of method and value.
Another accepted criterion, conservatism, suggests that desirable
positive theory should leave intact our other well-accepted views
230
about the world. Leiter maintains that legal positivism is more desirable than alternatives on this dimension because, among other
things, positivism is consistent with, supported by, and potentially
generative of empirical research programs on related issues:
A theory of law that makes explicit the tacit or inchoate concept at play in scientific research is probably to be preferred to its competitors. Positivism is that theory. If one
surveys . . . the now vast empirical literature on adjudication, which aims to explore the
relative contributions of legal versus non-legal norms to decision-making
by courts, that
231
literature always demarcates the distinction in positivist terms.

Accord Leiter, supra note 16, at 10 (making a similar argument for favoring legal positivism over alternatives).
See KUHN, supra note 12, at 321–22 (“[A] theory should be consistent, not only internally
or with itself, but also with other currently accepted theories applicable to related aspects
of nature.”); Leiter, supra note 19, at 1239. Some argue that this is more of an ex ante
threshold for distinguishing facially plausible theories from those unworthy of serious
consideration. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 191, at 1049.
Leiter, supra note 16, at 12.
See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 173 (presenting the attitudinal model of judicial
decision-making that tests for the causal power of non-legal reasons in adjudication).

So, too, SN’s capacity to distinguish what the law is from what one
thinks the law should be facilitates empirical analysis of the relative
influence of legal and non-legal reasons for decision. What matters
on this view is that judges act as if they accept SPT and similar norms
as valid norms of the constitutional system, not their reasons for that
acceptance; thus SN is consistent with any account of the real causes
232
of judicial decisions.
Value-driven and interpretive theory-of-law
claims, however, are inconsistent with empirical work like that on the
attitudinal model—they claim that judges should decide cases based
on some set of values or interpretive commitments, but the empirical
evidence suggests that such proposals are unrealistic in light of judges’ persistent tendency to act in ways not wholly predicted by legal
reasons. Its neutrality regarding reasons for acceptance means that
SN is also consistent with nearly every theory of adjudication or of
constitutional interpretation. And, importantly, it leaves intact our

229
230

231
232
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Wendel, supra note 191, at 1053; accord KUHN, supra note 12, at 321; PETER LIPTON,
INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 34 (2004).
See Rob Robinson, Does Prosecutorial Experience “Balance Out” a Judge’s Liberal Tendencies?, 32
JUST. SYS. J. 143, 144 (2011) (arguing that “the ‘attitudinal model’ has proven remarkably
robust in explaining much of the aggregate variance in appellate decisions” compared to
other models measuring the influence of social background factors); cf. Pauline T. Kim,
Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 395–407 (2007) (arguing that the attitudinal
model is incomplete, and articulating various critiques and concluding that law’s independent normative force explains many judicial decisions). See generally SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 173
See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.

well-established belief that the constitutional system is robust and stable despite observed disagreement.
A related criterion is fruitfulness—the extent to which a theory
“enable[s] us to say significant things, generate[s] insights, and ha[s]
233
implications for future research.”
It is not right to say that legal
theory cannot generate predictive hypotheses. The literature on the
attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, which tests the hypothesis that proxies for judges’ political views (such as the party of the
appointing president), is widely viewed as a robust and successful
234
predictive research program. This shows that legal theory can spur
empirical research—the attitudinal model was prompted and supported by the theoretical claim of the American Legal Realists and
others that legal reasons alone are insufficient to explain many judi235
cial decisions. The abstractness of norms like SPT means that positing them has little predictive power in itself—without more, the hypothesis that SPT is accepted predicts some constellation of judicial
actions aimed at preventing state interference with the constitutional
structure. That is what we see, but these observations are not terribly
surprising and do not crisply distinguish the SPT view from other explanations. However, SN provides a framework for developing more
determinate and testable hypotheses. For example, the argument
that SPT is implemented by a variety of doctrines whose differences
are attributable to non-legal considerations is more fruitful: We
could, for example, design experiments to test the causal power of
various instrumental or other non-legal factors in doctrinal formulation; we would just need reliable proxies for judges’ concerns about
institutional capital, interbranch conflicts, adjudicatory error rates,
and so forth.
In the next Part, I explore two aspects of SN’s theoretical desirability—its consistency with legal positivism and its capacity to advance
constitutional theory past problems associated with interpretive debate.

233
234

235
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III. CONSENSUS NORMS, LEGAL POSITIVISM, AND INTERPRETIVE
CONTROVERSY

See Gardner, supra note 146, at 199–200 (noting as a matter of intellectual history that
“[t]hose commonly said to constitute the dominant historical figures of the ‘legal positivist tradition’” include “Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, Hans Kelsen, and
Herbert Hart”); Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 168 (2004) (noting that the central and most abstract questions
of general jurisprudence have been pursued after Hart by Raz, Green, Gardner, and others). See generally RAZ, supra note 167; Green, supra note 157 (discussing H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d. ed. 1994)).
See DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 4–6 (arguing that interpretive disagreement is disagreement about “law’s grounds”); Scott J. Shapiro, The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short Guide for
the Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN 22, 49 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) (updating and reformulating the “theoretical disagreement” objection in Law’s Empire and distinguishing it
from Dworkin’s “semantic sting” objection).
For other responses, see Leiter, supra note 19, at 1215 (formulating “disingenuity” and
“error theory” responses to the objection).
See supra Part II.A.1 for my more detailed taxonomy.

In this Part, I explore aspects of Skeletal Norm’s theoretical conservatism in detail. First, I argue that this kind of account is more
consistent than alternatives with our best going general theory of law,
the legal positivism developed by Hans Kelsen, given definitive formulation by H.L.A. Hart, and refined over the last half century by Jo236
seph Raz, Leslie Green, John Gardner, and others. Explaining this
consistency also makes clear that this account is consistent with current, ongoing empirical research programs in law. Second, I address
interpretive controversy. The clash of rival theories of constitutional
interpretation has two salient consequences. Interpretive controversy
is the phenomenon that motivates Dworkin’s “theoretical disagreement” objection to legal positivism. If Supreme Court Justices’ disagreeing about the proper theory of constitutional interpretation constitutes disagreement about the criteria of legal validity, the argument
goes, than either we have no settled rule of recognition for constitutional law or there is something wrong with Hart’s account of the rule
237
of recognition as a social rule. SN generates a new refutation of the
238
theoretical disagreement line as it relates to constitutional law. Additionally, interpretive controversy dominates constitutional theory.
SN creates a path around interpretive debate so that theorists may
proceed with other inquiries without so much interpretive throat
clearing. Or so I shall argue.
From the taxonomy developed above we can group two clusters of
views that dominate modern constitutional theory—value-laden theo239
ries and interpretive theories.
Both are normative: Value-laden
theories are those theories of law or adjudication in which the consti236

237

238
239
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tutional norms that we have are said to be those that best promote
some value (democracy, justice, etc.) or on which proper constitu240
tional adjudication has courts working to maximize some value. Interpretive theories are normative theories of adjudication according
to which courts should go about discovering what the constitutional
241
law is through some particular series of steps. I argue that my view
is superior to value-driven theories because it is more consistent with
legal positivism and that my view is superior to interpretive theories
because it diffuses the problem of theoretical disagreement in a
manner that interpretive theories cannot.
A. Legal Positivism

See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 154, at 3–5 (providing “moralist” theory examples).
See supra notes 176–81 (listing interpretive theory samples).
Leiter, supra note 16, at 2.
See supra note 167; HART, supra note 16, at 269 (arguing that “the existence and content
of the law can be identified by reference to the social sources of the law”); cf. RAZ, supra
note 167, at 37, 47–48 (arguing that legal validity must be based on a norm’s sources, not
its merits); Gardner, supra note 149, at 200–01 (discussing versions of the sources thesis).
See HART, supra note 16, at 269 (discussing the difference between law and morality).
This is an inclusive positivist formulation of the sources thesis and its implications, and I
use it here not because it is necessarily my view but because it was Hart’s view and because
it facilitates the discussion to come. For the “hard” positivist version, see infra note 272.
HART, supra note 16, at 32, 94–95, 100–10; see also supra notes 165–68 and accompanying
text.
See John Gardner, Can There Be a Written Constitution?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHIL. OF
LAW 162–94 (Brian Leiter & Leslie Green eds., 2011).
Leiter, supra note 16, at 2.

Legal positivism is characterized by its two core claims—the
242
“sources” thesis and the “social rule” or “conventionality” thesis.
The sources thesis is that norms may be rendered legally valid solely
243
in virtue of their sources, without recourse to their merits. In other
words, a legal system’s ultimate criteria of legal validity, viz. the content of its rule of recognition, need not include merits-based crite244
ria.
The social rule thesis is that a legal system’s ultimate rule of
recognition is a social rule that is established by empirical fact, namely, the existence of a pattern of convergent practice by legal officials
demonstrating that they accept the relevant criteria of legal validity as
245
obligatory. The rule of recognition is thus not a legal rule; it is not
itself validated by satisfying criteria of legal validity—to hold other246
wise is to risk infinite regress. Legal positivism is a theory of law—a
“view that explains the crucial question that arises about law: Namely,
how do we determine which norms in any society are norms of the
247
legal system, that is, norms that are ‘legally valid.’” It is our best go240
241
242
243

244

245
246
247
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See, e.g., id. at 13–20 (considering and highlighting the shortcomings of various alternatives to legal positivism, including natural law theories, Scandinavian and American legal
realism, and Dworkin’s “law as integrity”); Gardner, supra note 146, at 199 (defending
positivism’s core claims against a variety of objections or characterizations predicated on
confusions about the core claims); see also RAZ, supra note 167, at 47–48.
See HART, supra note 16, at 97–98 (arguing that norms of basically any source—legislation,
judicial decisions, customs, etc.—can be law if officials treat them as law under the rule of
recognition).
A legal system may have multiple rules of recognition, but it must have an “ultimate” rule
of recognition by which the most fundamental legal rules of the system are validated and
which must itself be a social rule. See supra note 167, at 100-110; RAZ, The Identity of Legal
Systems, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 167, at 95–96. And, rules of recognition
can be complex, comprising multiple criteria of legal validity that may be conditionally
applicable to one form of purported legal norm but not others—do not be misled on this
score by the idea that the criteria constitute a “rule” of recognition. See HART, supra note
16, at 110 (noting that rules of recognition are established in a “complex” social practice); A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 77, 87 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (observing that rules of recognition, as
collections of potentially changing practices, are not especially “rule-like” in the conventional sense; they’re messier). See also Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1539–40 (1997) (suggesting that we better conceive of a set
of practices of recognition).
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621,
625–32 (1987); Kenneth Einar Himma, Final Authority to Bind with Moral Mistakes: On the
Explanatory Potential of Inclusive Legal Positivism, 24 LAW & PHIL. 1, 2 (2005); Kenneth Einar
Himma, Making Sense of Constitutional Disagreement: Legal Positivism, The Bill of Rights, and
the Conventional Rule of Recognition in the United States, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 149, 153 (2003).
See Stephen V. Carey, What is the Rule of Recognition in the United States?, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1161, 1176–92 (2009) (canvassing critiques of Greenawalt’s and Himma’s accounts).
Gardner, supra note 246, at 32.

ing positive theory of law, although I won’t defend that claim at
length here because the defense has been made at length else248
where. I will argue, however, that SN is more consistent with legal
positivism than competing theories of constitutional law, such as the
value-laden theories, and that this is an important reason to prefer
SN. So far, there is no account of constitutional norm identification
that is wholly compatible with legal positivism.
Norms that comport with the criteria of legal validity contained in
249
a legal system’s rule of recognition are law in the system.
Accordingly, to identify the constitutional norms that we have, positivism
suggests that we look for the American rule of recognition’s criteria
250
of legal validity for constitutional norms. However, thus far we have
no comprehensive account of our own rule of recognition—only a
251
handful of theorists have attempted to map its content and their
252
accounts are incomplete. Gardner notes that rules of recognition,
including the ultimate criteria of legal validity may be “indeterminate
253
in numerous respects.” This is especially likely for criteria of legal

248

249

250

251

252
253
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validity for constitutional law, given the debates between constitu254
tional theory claims belonging to theories of law.
How, then, should we approach the norm identification question?
Without a complete account of our ultimate rule of recognition with
respect to constitutional norms, we might do well to look for norms
that appear to sit at the center of convergent official practice—as I
255
have done above. Norms supported by such a consensus are more
likely to be legally valid insofar as they are surrounded by the indicia
of official acceptance that are the hallmarks of a functioning rule of
recognition—that is, norms broadly accepted as legally valid seem
more likely to be consistent with consensus-supported criteria of legal
256
validity than, say, norms advocated by originalist judges but disput257
ed by living constitutionalist judges. Indeed, there is no theoretical
obstacle to our (or any) rule of recognition validating some norms as
law just in virtue of their broad and durable acceptance as legally
binding by legal officials; all this would require is a pattern of official
acceptance recognizing that in some circumstances patterns of official acceptance are sufficient for legal validity.
Such norms are analogous to norms of customary law; that is, law
which “in foro requires for its existence a temporally extended pattern
of relatively convergent behavior by multiple law-applying officials”
which pattern suggests that the officials accept the custom as legally
258
binding.
Customary norms may become constitutional law norms
upon a long-term pattern of legal officials’ accepting that the norms
259
have constitutional status.
Importantly, while the formation of a
system’s rule of recognition requires a pattern of convergent official
practice recognizing a set of validity criteria, legal obligations themselves do not require such a pattern to be operative legal obliga-

254
255

256

257

258

259

See supra notes 155–70 and accompanying text.
Cf. Gardner, supra note 246, at 15–16 (arguing that “ultimate rules of recognition,” which
he calls constitutional rules that are “above the law,” are matters of social fact, identifiable
according to their place at the center of convergent practices).
Cf. Leiter, supra note 19, at 1224 (suggesting that sincere debate among legal officials
about the criteria of legal validity shows that there is no rule of recognition, and thus no
pre-existing legal answer on the disputed issue).
For a discussion of living constitutionalism, see generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2010); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737
(2007).
Gardner, supra note 246, at 34; see also HART, supra note 16, at 44–48, 97–98 (arguing that
a rule of recognition could validate custom); Schauer, supra note 18, at 531 (discussing
the idea of customs becoming law under a positivist rule of recognition).
See Gardner, supra note 246, at 5 (arguing that, on a positivist account, norms gain constitutional status from the convergent behavior of “the law-applying officials who . . . treat
them as having that status”).
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tions. The rule of recognition may recognize duly enacted legislation, judicial decisions, and so forth, as legally binding in virtue of
their sources regardless of any official behavior or public attitudes
261
about the specific legal norm embodied in the statute or decision.
But this does not rule out the possibility that some norms—like customary law norms—may be legally valid in virtue of patterns of convergent practice alone, or perhaps in combination with the satisfaction of other validity criteria if convergent practice alone is
262
The Stateinsufficient under the particular rule of recognition.
Preclusion-Thesis-like norms I hypothesize here may be constitutional
263
norms of the form of customary law; but where the custom arises
among legal officials rather than some segment of the general pub264
lic.
The Supreme Court frequently makes statements of the form
260

261
262

263

264

See Leiter, supra note 236, at 171 (“Dworkin demonstrated quite persuasively that Hart was
mistaken to claim that the existence of a duty always requires the existence of . . . a practice of convergent behavior in which those engaged in the behavior accept a rule describing their conduct as a standard to which they felt bound to adhere.”).
HART, supra note 16, at 97–98.
This is not to say either that consensus on individual norms’ legal validity is a general requirement of any rule of recognition or that the absence of consensus on norms’ legal validity always demonstrates a putative norm’s invalidity or the absence of consensus validity
criteria in the area. Neither is necessarily true. A rule of recognition can in principle (1)
validate consensus norms in virtue of the consensus alone; (2) validate legislated norms
in virtue of their having been duly legislated alone; (3) validate constitutional norms in
virtue of their derivability according to some particular interpretive method (or a set of
approved interpretive methods). Indeed, a complex rule of recognition might contain all
of these criteria and more.
Here, I am assuming that judges and Justices tacitly accept SPT-like norms ex ante, before
they formulate implementing doctrines and render decisions consistent with the norms.
I have elsewhere explored a slightly different account of how these norms might be accepted, see Garrick B. Pursley, Properties in Constitutional Systems, 92 N.C. L. REV. 547, 584–
89 (2014) (reviewing Adrian Vermeule, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011)), an
account that diverges slightly from Hart’s view that acceptance from “the internal point of
view” requires a conscious decision to abide by a norm viewed as legally obligatory. HART,
supra note 16, at 255. If, instead, norms simply emerge as durable patterns in constitutional decisions over time—as emergent properties of the constitutional system—we
might extend Hart’s conception of how criteria of legal validity become part of a system’s
rule of recognition to include something other than standard, conscious adoption. See
Pursley, supra, at 585–88.
My view is not a form of popular constitutionalism, although it is compatible with popular
constitutionalist theories. See supra, note 190. On Hart’s view, the consensus of legal officials on the criteria of legal validity is a central feature of legal systems, HART, supra note
16, at 94–95, even if there also may be a public consensus, the two are not necessarily
connected and the latter is not necessarily required. HART, supra note 16, at 60–61, 116.
However, this view neither requires nor precludes the possibility that our rule of recognition might contain criteria that validate popularly accepted norms. See Gardner, supra
note 246, at 34 (discussing customary law); Abner S. Green, What is Constitutional Obligation, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1239, 1245–46 & n.37 (2013) (“Hart says only official acceptance is
necessary, but he does not say rules of recognition may not include citizen participa-
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“we have long accepted,” “it is well-established,” or “courts accept,”
which suggest that our rule of recognition might well incorporate a
265
criterion of legal validity for patterns of official consensus.
Now contrast, in terms of consistency with legal positivism, a valuebased theory of law on which the constitutional law consists in those
266
norms that best promote a substantive value like social justice.
Though a rule of recognition on the “exclusive” legal positivist view
may incorporate only source-based criteria of legal validity: “inclusive” legal positivism holds that any given rule of recognition may include evaluative criteria (although no rule of recognition need do
267
so). But on either positivist view, where a consensus of officials accepts criteria that validate the norm as binding, we need not be concerned with the reasons why they decide in a manner that suggests

265

266

267

tion”); cf. Stephen Perry, Where Have All the Powers Gone? Hartian Rules of Recognition,
Noncognitivism, and the Constitutional and Jurisprudential Foundations of Law, in THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 295, 300 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar
Himma eds., 2009) (suggesting that Hart’s rules of recognition might exclude popular
acceptance as a validity criterion); Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule
of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 720–33 (2006)
(same).
See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (“It is well established that
Congress’ judgment regarding exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial deference.”); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238, 249 & n.12 (1983) (“[C]ourts agree that an expectation of receiving process is not,
without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 71 (2004) (arguing that constitutional norms should be identified on an account of the Constitution as a “justice seeking” collection of norms); cf.
DWORKIN, supra note 14, 178 (arguing that the law is that which best fits and morally justifies the other legal norms of the legal system).
Whether this is the best account of the general structure of rules of recognition remains
open to debate. This view is characteristic of inclusive legal positivism, and seems to be
the view that Hart himself accepted. HART, supra note 16, at 253, 269 (maintaining that
“the existence and content of law can be identified by reference to the social sources of
law”); see also Gardner, supra note 149, at 200–01 (discussing various formulations of the
source thesis, which he states as “(LP*) In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of the system, depends on its sources,
not its merits (where its merits, in the relevant sense, include the merits of its sources)”).
A stronger statement of the sources thesis has it that a legal system’s ultimate rule of
recognition cannot incorporate merits-based criteria. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 167, at 45–
52 (discussing versions of the thesis and defending, in the end, a stronger version, i.e. that
laws are valid solely in virtue of their sources and not their merits). Defenders of the first
formulation are “soft” or “inclusive” positivists (because they include the possibility of
some legal systems with merits-based validity criteria); defenders of the latter version are
“hard” or “exclusive” positivists (because on their view merits-based criteria cannot be criteria of legal validity). Gardner, supra note 149, at 200–01. On inclusive legal positivism,
see generally WILLIAM J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994); Kenneth Einar
Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125 (Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro eds., 2002).
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acceptance of the relevant criteria. Thus a system’s rule of recognition may validate norms based on their merits, validate customary
norms based on a consensus that they are law, or validate norms that
both enjoy consensus acceptance and comply with merits criteria.
Value-based theories of law are in tension with positivism’s social
fact thesis. There is substantial debate about the proper value criteria
on which to assess competing claims about the content of constitutional norms. In addition to the various claims that Φ or Ψ is the
principal value a norm must advance to be properly considered a valid norm of constitutional law; other accounts combine multiple val269
ues in various ways.
This makes it difficult to square value-driven
theories with legal positivism, since the debate about values would
seem to forestall the possibility of official consensus on value-based
270
criteria of legal validity. In any case, my claim here is not that SPTlike norms exhaust the set of constitutional norms—that is, I am not
claiming that our rule of recognition is occupied solely by criteria
that validate customary norms as law. My modest claim is that SPTlike norms validated by cross-theoretical consensus may be some of
our constitutional norms. In other words, I am speculating that while
value-based requirements may be part of our rule of recognition, they
are likely not the only criteria, or mandatory criteria (that is, necessary
conditions) for the validity of constitutional norms. Norms might be
validated by satisfying one of multiple subsets of criteria of legal validity, some of which might incorporate evaluative criteria and others
271
not.
The point here is just that one validity criterion might be
whether there is a durable consensus as to the legal and constitution272
al status of the relevant proposition.
On this view of our rule of recognition, we could categorize certain norms as part of the Constitution by observing the fact of their
general acceptance as illustrated by patterns of convergent official
behavior without regard to the officials’ reasons for accepting the
norm. On a value-driven view, we could not make sense of the idea
of official acceptance constituting prima facie evidence of legal validity—we would need to know the officials’ reasons for acceptance, and
268
269
270
271
272

See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206; Dorf, supra note 193, at 595–96 (discussing value disagreement).
See DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 4–6; Leiter, supra note 19, at 1220–22 (discussing this kind
of dispute and its effect on the social fact thesis).
See supra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing complex rules of recognition).
This seems to be the simplest form of validity criterion a system’s legal officials might
adopt, at least insofar as it is similar to the criteria by which we validate the rule of recognition itself, namely a convergent pattern of acceptance and the requisite attitude. See
HART, supra note 16, at 94–105 (discussing the process of social rule formation).
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only if their reasons match our basic value proposition and the norm
itself advances the value could we explain why they legitimately accept the norm as legally binding. Such a view will also frequently require us to characterize some norms that clearly are accepted by a
consensus of legal officials as not legitimately part of the Constitution
(that the officials’ acceptance of the norms is in error) because the
norm does not satisfy our value criterion. Both possibilities are in273
consistent with the social fact thesis; but both are likely to arise frequently on a value-based constitutional theory of law because of the
deep disagreement among officials on questions of political and
274
moral value. SN, by contrast, can reconcile value criteria with legal
positivism by suggesting that both consensus norms and deep disagreement about values can obtain under a single, admittedly com275
plex, rule of recognition. This approach helps explain how we can
observe both deep disagreement on questions of political morality and
constitutional interpretation and relatively robust stability and durability in our constitutional system.
B. Interpretive Controversy and Theoretical Disagreement
The State Preclusion Thesis and the other hypothetical structural
norms that I propose we use to augment our explanatory account of
structural doctrine are abstract for a variety of reasons; but one important benefit of their abstractness is that they might be affirmed by
276
adherents to most major theories of constitutional interpretation.
This suggests that some basic consensuses survive the clash of interpretive theories. Of course, my primary goal here is explanatory—I
want to explain what courts are doing in structural cases and, accordingly, if these norms are the best explanation of the doctrine and results we observe, I’m not terribly concerned with the extent to which
interpretive theorists agree that the norms are validly derived from
273
274
275
276

See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing competing value-based constitutional theories of law).
Even in consensus norm implementation, value debates about how to craft implementing
rules to further this or that value may (and probably will) occur.
See Pursley, supra note 9, at 514–528 (giving reasons why adherents of various interpretive
theories could accept SPT). Strict constitutional textualists might deny SPT’s validity just
because it is an unwritten norm, see for example John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2013–20 (2009)
(denying the legitimacy of unwritten structural norms tout court). But inferring SPT requires only the modest assumption that the obvious intention to make the Constitution
durable, which seems sufficiently fundamental to their purpose of a Constitution as to be
a relatively uncontroversial imputation, is relevant to interpretation, an assumption that
even strict textualists would be hard pressed to deny. Pursley, supra note 9, at 534–36.
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the Constitution. This is a breakthrough in at least two senses: It can
help advance constitutional theory past interpretive debate and it can
provide a new answer to the “theoretical disagreement” objection to
legal positivism.
But it is easy enough, if it appears that all constitutional questions
hang in suspense until the interpretive theory debate is resolved,
analysis of other forms of reasoning in constitutional cases will tend
to take on secondary importance. Identifying certain basic consensus
norms like SPT, acceptable on most theories of interpretation, that
are implemented in a variety of contexts with a wide range of doctrinal mechanisms shifts the focus of our normative debates about structural doctrine from interpretive issues to the instrumental reasoning
issues that shape doctrinal rules once the interpretive question is set277
tled in an operative proposition.
This is not to say that interpretive debate is valueless. It is of
course beneficial to think carefully through questions of interpretive
method, develop coherent theories of interpretation, and engage in
the broader normative debates that often lurk in the background of
278
interpretive debates.
For example, one normative debate that frequently goes hand-in-hand with the originalism/non-originalism debate concerns judicial constraint: Originalism initially was offered as
a palliative for the countermajoritarian difficulty in virtue of its capacity to constrain judges and, by its unyielding insistence on historically
fixed meaning, prevent them from “making” law, engaging in “poli279
cymaking,” or reverting to “result-oriented judging.” Living consti280
tutionalism, by contrast, is “juristocratic” —its proponents evince a
wide-bodied trust in judges’ capacity to fairly update constitutional
281
meaning in the light of changing circumstances. This debate is, in
other words, partly a debate about the actual bite of the countermajoritarian difficulty, a problem that has preoccupied constitutional
277
278

279

280
281

See Berman, supra note 10, at 35–37, 61–72 (discussing pragmatic concerns shaping decision rules).
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Reconstruction and Resistance, 91 TEX. L. REV. 121, 123–24 (2012)
(reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING] and
JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD
(2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, REDEMPTION]).
Roosevelt, supra note 278, at 124; see, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 415–20 (1977); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 (1989);.
Alexander, supra note 154, at 7.
See Roosevelt, supra note 278, at 124; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 24–26 (1962)
(“Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the
ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government.”).
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theorists since the beginning of the research program; until it is resolved the interpretive debates driven by concerns about judicial con283
straint will continue. Perhaps “none of the theories offered to address the countermajoritarian difficulty succeeds in persuading
because the countermajoritarian difficulty and the premises supporting it do not rest upon an accurate portrayal of the constitutional sys284
tem we actually enjoy.”
Although it is tangential here, this once
again points to the need for a renewed focus on positive constitutional theory.
In addition, a case can be made that some on both sides of the
originalism/non-originalism debate are at least partly driven by polit285
ical motivations or a desire for certain substantive results. This, too,
suggests that the debate may be irresolvable—if the choice of theories
is a matter of determining which is most consistent with one’s value286
related priors, then Judge Posner was right to suggest that interpre287
tive theories do not have “agreement-coercing” power. Here again,
the differences between normative constitutional theory and scientific theory bear emphasizing—people may legitimately disagree on
questions of political morality or other constitutional values; thus the
criteria for theory acceptance in this context are not sufficiently uni288
versal to make such coercion possible. Even Jack Balkin’s grand ef282

283
284
285

286

287
288

The countermajoritarian difficulty is, according to some, “the central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.” Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998); Keith
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80
N.C. L. REV. 773, 777–78 (2002) (similar). Bickel coined the term “countermajoritarian
difficulty” in 1962. BICKEL, supra note 281, at 16–18. For an overview of the debate, see
generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 584 (1993) (noting
that the problem may be “insoluble”).
Id.
See Roosevelt, supra note 278, at 122–24 (“[A]s a matter of actual historical fact, the political description [of the stakes and motivations in the interpretive theory debate], reductionist though it may be, is largely correct.”).
See Roosevelt, supra note 278, at 123 (suggesting that President Ronald Reagan and Ed
Meese, two important early proponents of modern originalism, “were not abstract constitutional scholars; they were interested in political results like reigning in judges”); see also
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 680–82 (2009) (noting that during
President Reagan’s first term, Republicans attempted to reign in federal judges).
Posner, supra note 11, at 3.
See Dorf, supra note 193, at 595 (“Because no two participants in the debates about constitutional law and constitutional theory will have identical views about [questions of constitutional value], there will be as many constitutional theories as there are people who care
to think about constitutional theory.”); see also Bartrum, supra note 197, at 263 (“Kuhn’s
claim that underlying value judgments determine our theory choices . . . reminds us that
interpretive theory choices are, in fact, choices and suggests that we should be transpar-
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fort to reconcile originalism with living constitutionalism faces an
uphill battle so long as inter-theoretical competition is driven by in290
compatible underlying normative agendas.
Finally, one might conclude that both originalism and living constitutionalism “as they are conventionally understood,” are “both ob291
viously defective theories that no sensible person would hold.”
As
Kermit Roosevelt explains:
Classic living constitutionalism is silly for all the reasons conservatives
point out. The idea that judges must sometimes, somehow “update” the
Constitution to keep it in step with the times is neither helpful to a judge
trying in good faith to discharger her role, nor encouraging to a citizen
wanting to see himself as a participant in the ongoing project of constitutional self-governance . . . . Classic originalism is no better, however. It
makes a profound error in supposing that fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution requires that cases be decided, to the extent possible, as if they had been brought immediately after the ratification of the
relevant constitutional provision . . . . This view is obviously mistaken because while some constitutional provisions might be intended to fix outcomes in that way, others might not. . . . Determinate rules, such as those
setting age-based qualifications for office, dictate particular results regardless of time and circumstance . . . [but] [s]tandards, such as the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable” searches, may di292
rect different results as times and circumstances change.

On top of everything else, then, theorists engaged in interpretive debates might be chasing a truly elusive prize. These observations suggest that we should embrace new methods for doing constitutional
theory without the need for throat clearing regarding interpretive
priors and careful bracketing of possible interpretive objections
against claims the theorists wants to defend.
SN also suggests a new refutation of the “theoretical disagreement” objection to legal positivism. The objection trades on the supposition that when judges disagree about interpretive method, they
293
disagree about the criteria of legal validity. Now, disagreements about

289
290
291
292
293

ent and explicit about the value judgments that underlie those decisions.”). But see id. at
264 (“[S]hared values can provide some objective ground to assess particular theory
choices.”); Fallon, supra note 150, at 549–50 (same). The idea of consensus-based value
acceptance resonates with my claim about consensus norms, but the empirical question as
to whether such value consensuses exist is open and worth exploring.
See generally BALKIN, LIVING, supra note 278.
See Roosevelt, supra note 278, at 125–26 (criticizing Balkin’s project on this ground).
Id. at 125.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a comprehensive catalogue of the problems with originalism
both classical and new, see generally Berman, supra note 181.
DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 4–6. Dworkin’s examples of theoretical disagreement arise in
the context of statutory, not constitutional, interpretation; however the argument, mutatis
mutandis, has the same force in the context of constitutional interpretation.
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Id. at 5.
Leiter, supra note 19, at 1222.
See id. at 1219 (“Some disagreements are . . . merely ‘empirical’; that is, the parties agree
about the criteria of legal validity . . . but disagree about whether those criteria are satisfied in a particular case.”).
See id. at 1222 (“Judges engaged in Dworkinian theoretical disagreement are disagreeing
about the meaning of the authoritative sources of law and thus about what the law requires them to do in particular cases . . . .”).
Id. at 1223.
See DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 6 (arguing that the debate as to whether “judges make or
find law” “could easily be settled . . . if there were no theoretical disagreement about the
grounds of the law”).
Leiter, supra note 19, at 1227.

law can arise despite having a settled rule of recognition; for example, officials operating under a consensus view of the criteria of legal
294
validity may nevertheless have “empirical” disagreements about (1)
whether there is sufficient consensus on some validity criterion (e.g.,
a dispute about whether judges generally accept customary interna295
tional law as binding in the United States); or (2) whether settled
criteria of legal validity are satisfied in a particular case (e.g., a dis296
pute about whether Congress actually enacted a statute).
But if
judges who say they disagree about the proper method of constitutional interpretation do, at least in some cases, truly believe that they
297
are involved in a dispute about the criteria of legal validity, then this
kind of disagreement is difficult to reconcile with the positivist claim
that every legal system has a set of consensus-based criteria of legal validity. That is, “the positivist theory . . . fails to explain . . . what it appears the judges are disputing . . . . They write as if there is a fact of
the matter about what the law is, even though they disagree about the
298
criteria that fix what the law is.” So, Dworkin argued, legal positivism is incomplete because it cannot explain this phenomenon of our
299
legal system.
We saw above that value-based theories of law are inconsistent
with legal positivism’s source thesis; interpretive theories run into
trouble with legal positivism here—they invite theoretical disagreement and thus are inconsistent with positivism’s social fact thesis as to
constitutional law. By way of general response to the theoretical disagreement objection, Leiter has correctly noted that legal positivism
explains perfectly well the most important phenomenon of our legal
system, the “massive and pervasive agreement about the law through300
out the system.” The vast majority of legal issues are resolved without the theoretical disagreements Dworkin emphasizes, which arise
only in a small subset of appellate cases while most judicial decisions
do not involve such disputes and, moreover, the vast majority of legal
294
295
296

297

298
299

300
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See id. at 1226 (“[T]heoretical disagreements about law represent only a miniscule fraction of all judgments rendered about law, since most judgments about law involve agreement, not disagreement.”).
Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary as a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 556 (2005).
See Leiter, supra note 19, at 1224–25 (“[T[he Disingenuity account claims only that judges
have an unconscious or preconscious awareness that there is no ‘law’ to be found.”)
Id. at 1223.

questions are resolved by attorneys without resort to the courts.
Thus, Dworkin’s seeming insistence that theoretical disagreement is a
central phenomenon of the legal system is misplaced. This problem
of theoretical disagreement is, however, more pointed when we focus
on cases involving substantial interpretive questions, where the “history of interpretive theory in American courts is, above all, a history
of persistent and deep disagreement among judges and courts about
302
the proper methods and sources of legal interpretation.” Questions
of constitutional interpretation provoke the most theoretical disagreement; thus the objection has the heightened force with respect
to constitutional adjudication and potentially undermines the existence of a settled rule of recognition for constitutional law. While this
affects only a small fraction of legal disputes, and thus does not
threaten legal positivism’s superiority as a general account of entire
legal systems; it is troubling because it might undermine positivism’s
capacity to account for the operation of a system’s most fundamental
law.
Leiter offers two straightforward positivist responses to the objection: Judges engaged in theoretical disagreement act as though there
is a fact of the matter about what the law is, but they are either being
disingenuous or they are in error insofar as the theoretical disagreement disproves the existence of consensus validity criteria on the is303
sue.
He admits, however, that these responses only “explain[]
304
The SN account points
away” the face value of the disagreement.
up a new rejoinder: Even our typically contentious constitutional law
may be characterized by significant official consensus on some of the
most basic and important norms—structural norms that stabilize our
system and create the framework in which other interpretive debates
can take place without the system breaking down. Interpretive theory
of law claims—maintaining that the only correct way for courts to
identify the constitutional norms that we have is to adopt one of the
interpretive theories that are so hotly contested—seem to feed into
the theoretical disagreement problem and run headlong into conflict
with the social fact thesis by undermining the idea of consensus criteria of legal validity with respect to constitutional norms. Thus consti301

302
303
304
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tutional adjudication is no longer a counterexample, or even a particularly problematic case, for legal positivism. This response does
more than just explain away theoretical disagreement in constitutional cases—it suggests that basic structural constitutional norms
may durably exist despite theoretical disagreement on other constitutional issues, rendering the theoretical disagreement critique inter305
esting but not disabling as it relates to constitutional law.
* * * * * *
The SPT account of structural doctrine and ex hypothesi SN track
the core claims of legal positivism and focus on observed instances of
apparent consensus among legal officials; they thus explain a central
phenomenon of our constitutional system: Despite our heated and
long-lived interpretive, value, and theoretical debates, we have a stable
306
Value-driven and interpretive theories of law
constitutional system.
miss or downplay this stability. While there may well be instances of
genuine theoretical disagreement—our rule of recognition may even
307
include evaluative or interpretive criteria of legal validity —those are
not the only phenomena in the system, and they may not be among
308
the most important.
In any case, we should prefer a theory that
captures both the disagreements and the consensuses to alternatives
that do not.
CONCLUSION
While one might object that affirming the validity of norms like
SPT is too commonsensical to yield any benefits; I offer the foregoing
exploration of how explaining of multiple lines of complex constitutional doctrine as predicated on these simple, obvious propositions
advances constitutional theory past difficult and persistent conceptual
challenges. Building out a broader theory of this form promises significant fruit, enabling entirely new categories of normative constitutional theory work focusing on the pragmatic justifications for various
305

306
307
308

This mirrors Leiter’s argument that theoretical disagreement is not a central feature of a
legal system in which the central phenomenon is massive and pervasive agreement about
the law. See id. at 1228.
Cf. id. (“One of the great theoretical virtues of legal positivism . . . is that it explains . . . the pervasive phenomenon of legal agreement.”).
See supra note 272.
Cf. Leiter, supra note 19, at 1220 (“[E]ven if we agreed . . . that legal positivism provided
an unsatisfactory account of theoretical disagreement in law, this would be of no significance unless we thought that this phenomenon was somehow central to an understanding of the nature of law and legal systems.”).
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implementing doctrines and providing a new set of parameters for
empirical study of the views of the public and legal officials that
could, at last, lead to some falsifiable hypotheses. In the end, I hope
that this idea will share a “hallmark of truly deep insights; they seem
309
obvious in retrospect.”
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